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ABSTRACT 
 
Copperheads and Blacksnakes: Divided Loyalty in Eastern Pennsylvania 
 
Chuck Welsko 
This is a study of people, politics, and rhetoric during the American Civil War. The 
people are eastern Pennsylvanians, the ordinary men and women from Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and 
Northampton counties. The narrative traces the failure of these people to unify in the Civil War.  
Instead, citizens used a rhetoric of loyalty to fuel the bitter divide between Democrats and 
Republicans. Historians have studied the concept of loyalty extensively in the past, but only with 
the purpose of identifying which political or ethnic subgroups of the population were “loyal.” 
Copperheads and Blacksnakes moves beyond the issue of who and focuses rather on the how of 
loyalty: the ways in which individuals—soldiers, civilians, newspaper editors—constructed 
notions of loyalty and used those conceptions in political discourse. 
 The results of such a study are dramatically different than previous scholarship. Eastern 
Pennsylvanians’ added their definitions of loyalty to an established political culture. At the start 
of the war, Democrats and Republicans invoked sentiments of antipartisanship to form a 
common, singular sense of unity. Within weeks though, that appeal for unity and nonpartisanship 
faltered, first amongst newspaper editors, then amongst local residents as the Union suffered 
military defeats, national elections approached, and the Lincoln Administration adjusted Federal 
policy (with the advent of taxes, conscription, and emancipation) to crush the Confederacy. 
Political partisans in eastern Pennsylvania came to view their opponents disloyal to the nation, 
exaggerating the pre-war divisions and partisanship that dominated American politics. Citizens 
used loyalty to advance the interests of one party, one part of the population, that they believed 
was both virtuous and capable of restoring the fragmented American nation. As a result, the Civil 
War generated a period where derisive political rhetoric gained legitimacy as eastern 
Pennsylvanians envisioned their ‘disloyal’ political opponents as threats to the nation, ushering 
in an intensified and more deeply divided polity. 
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Introduction 
On March 26 and April 2, 1863, an article titled “Copperheads vs. Blacksnakes” appeared 
in both the Easton Argus and Easton Sentinel, two Democratic newspapers in the city of Easton, 
Pennsylvania. William Hutter and Daniel H. Neiman, the respective editors of both papers 
responded to an attack from J. P. Hetrich, the editor and proprietor of the Northampton County 
Journal, a Republican paper published within the same city limits. On March 4, Hetrich wrote 
that “It cannot be denied that an analogy between this loathsome creature [copperhead snakes] 
and the mean, sneaking politicians who are now distracting the Northern mind with cries of 
peace is quite striking,” because like the snake, Democrats were “venomous” to the Union war 
effort.
1
 In response, Neiman and Hutter proudly proclaimed their support for the term 
Copperhead, a nickname often associated with the anti-war, anti-Lincoln faction of the Civil War 
Democratic Party. Their article noted that the “copperhead” was native to the United States and 
was a “fearless, independent” creature that was both “brave…and therefore naturally tolerant, 
harmless, and passive,” unless it is assailed, which would prove fatal to their foe. On the other 
hand, the editors saw “the representative of the Abolitionist [Republicans]…the “blacksnake”” as 
“a cowardly, hissing, thieving reptile,” that stole, robbed, and was worthy of destruction.2 Each 
editor, on both sides of the political divide substituted snakes for political parties, coupling their 
political opponents with the imagery of the slithering, disreputable reptile. This exchange, the 
constant debate between newspaper editors and later amongst other residents of eastern 
Pennsylvania, fueled the debate over loyalty that pervaded the North during the American Civil 
War. The constant attempts by eastern Pennsylvanians in Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and 
Northampton Counties to paint their political opponents as disloyal threats to the nation created a 
                                                 
1
 Northampton County Journal, March 4, 1863. 
2
 Easton Argus, April 2, 1863; Easton Sentinel, March 26, 1863.  
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serious crisis in northern politics, which merits more attention from historians of the Civil War 
era. 
These four counties, located north and northwest of Philadelphia, partially alongside the 
Delaware River, and in the shadows of the Appalachian Mountains offer an excellent place to 
study loyalty because they were fairly typical for nineteenth century America. Berks, Bucks, 
Lehigh, and Northampton were rural counties. They possessed some light manufacturing, 
predominantly in the iron and coal industries, and market economies, but most residents toiled in 
the fields. As a result, each county possessed a limited number of urban centers: Reading (Berks 
County), Doylestown (Bucks County), Allentown (Lehigh County), and Bethlehem and Easton 
(Northampton County), while most men and women remained in small villages or towns.
 
1
 At the time of the Civil War, after roughly two centuries of settlement by Dutch, 
Swedish, and predominately German settlers, the regional population had grown from a few 
hundred to roughly 94,000 residents in Berks County, 63,000 residing in Bucks County, 43,000 
throughout Lehigh County, and another 47,000 in Northampton County.
2
 
                                                 
11
 W. W. H. Davis, The History of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, from the Discovery of the Delaware to the Present 
Time, (Doylestown, PA: Democrat Book and Job Office Print, 1876), 23, 444, 712; William J. Heller, History of 
Northampton County[Pennsylvania] and the Grand Valley of the Lehigh, (New York: The American Historical 
Society, 1920), 42, 52-3, 149, 161, 269; Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County in Pennsylvania, 
(Philadelphia: Everts, Peck & Richards, 1886), 3, 5-6, 7, 11-2, 24-5; Daniel I. Rupp, History of Northampton, 
Lehigh, Monroe, Carbon, and Schuylkill Counties: Containing a Brief History of the First Settlers; Topography of 
Townships; Notices of Leading Events, Incidents, and Interesting Facts in the Early History of these Counties, 
(Harrisburg, PA: Hickok and Cantine, Printers and Binders, 1845), 1-9, 12-3, 25, 111. 
2
 These figures are approximations, because from the sources there seemed are some minor discrepancies. In the 
Berks & Schuylkill Journal, the population figures for Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and Northampton counties respectively 
are 94,043, 63,803, 43,932, 47,775. Heller on the other noted that the population of Northampton County was 
47,900 in 1861 and Montgomery positioned the populations of Berks as 93,818, Bucks at 63, 578, and Lehigh at 43, 
753 in his work. The even estimates on my part are an attempt to paint a rough picture of the region’s population, 
bringing together the figures from these different sources. Berks & Schuylkill Journal, November 17, 1860; Heller, 
History of Northampton County, 161; Montgomery, History of Berks County, 647. Additionally, Berks, Lehigh, and 
Northampton counties each contained one German paper during the Civil War. I was unable however to read these 
papers, due in large part to a dearth of my abilities in German as well as the fact that some papers were unattainable. 
However, each of these papers, as evidenced from the pro-Republican papers in eastern Pennsylvania identify the 
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 Eastern Pennsylvania represented the agrarian, (but also slightly urban) character of Civil 
War America, but it also presented a unique political background as well. Eastern 
Pennsylvanians, and Keystone Staters in general, possessed a long affiliation with conservative 
political traditions. After the American Revolution, the Pennsylvania constitution favored a weak 
government, which shunned the federal centralization of power.
3
 A prime example in 
Northampton and Bucks counties, Jacob Fries organized four hundred men to demand the release 
of several men arrested for resisting a 1798 tax. Fries wanted to return the men for local, not 
federal trials, but was branded a traitor by the government, and stopped by a militia raised from 
Lancaster County.
4
  Reflecting this strong conservative tradition, eastern Pennsylvania provided 
a solid base of support for the Democratic Party throughout much of the antebellum period.
5
 
However, in the 1860 Presidential Election, the local voters divided between support for a 
Republican and Democratic candidate. Both Berks and Northampton counties remained solidly 
Democratic, voting almost with a two to one margin against Abraham Lincoln and the other 
presidential hopefuls. Most voters of Berks and Northampton supported the Democratic Fusion 
ticket, offering their votes to either John Breckinridge or Stephen Douglas, whichever Democrat 
they felt had the better chance of securing the Presidency. Lehigh and Bucks County, on the 
other hand, edged out victories for Abraham Lincoln. Other surrounding counties in eastern 
                                                                                                                                                             
fact that the German papers were solidly German, providing similar discussions of loyalty as their English speaking 
Democrat counterparts. The German papers included the Reading Adler from Berks County, the Republikaner in 
Lehigh County (which despite its name was a Democratic papers) and the Correspondent and Demokrat in 
Northampton County. Furthermore, David L. Valuska identified Berks, Lehigh, and Northampton Counties as 
“Dutch Counties” during the Civil War. David L. Valuska and Christian Keller, Damn Dutch: Pennsylvania 
Germans at Gettysburg, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2010), 47. 
3
 Ronald P. Formisano, For the People: American Populist Movements from the Revolution to the 1850s, (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 21-2; Arnold Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 
1861-1865, (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980), 16. 
4
 Formisano, For the People, 58; Heller, History of Northampton County, 131-42; Rupp, History of Northampton, 
Lehigh, Monroe, Carbon, and Schuylkill Counties, 116. 
5
 Heller, History of Northampton County, 241-6; Montgomery, History of Berks County, 476; Shankman, The 
Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 16. 
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Pennsylvania mirrored this divide, yet by 1864, each county voted strongly for the Democratic 
candidate George McClellan.
6
 
 The rhetoric of loyalty produced by Democrats and Republicans dominated political 
discourse throughout the war. For a brief period at the onset of the Civil War, residents of eastern 
Pennsylvania presented themselves as united behind nationalism and antipartisanship in their 
course to crush the Confederacy and restore the American Union. They portrayed the North as 
loyal and the Confederacy, along with anyone who supported them, as disloyal. But Eastern 
Pennsylvanians’ enthusiasm for unity reflected only a façade built on traditional political rhetoric 
that supported the ideal of antipartisanship. In essence, eastern Pennsylvanians mirrored the 
wider political culture of the nineteenth century. Antipartisan rhetoric dominated much of the 
early American political system when Federalists and Democratic-Republicans positioned 
themselves as opposed to party politics in the hope of attracting voters and legitimizing their 
party.
7
 While local residents adopted a similar language that eschewed party at the start of the 
war, their sincerity was questionable. As the war progressed, battle defeats mounted, and public 
policy (especially in terms of emancipation and conscription) changed, Democrats and 
Republicans quickly painted their partisan opponents as disloyal elements working against the 
restoration of the nation. 
 This transition to antagonistic uses of loyalty began first with local newspaper editors but 
slowly filtered into the correspondences of local residents. Such a transition also represented 
                                                 
6
 Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 18, 135-6, 199-200; Bucks County Intelligencer, November 13, 
1860, October 27, 1863; Doylestown Democrat, October 27, 1863; Easton Sentinel, November 15, 1860; Reading 
Gazette and Democrat, October 17, 1863. 
7
 Ronald Formisano, The Transformation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s-1840s, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), especially pages 11-4 as well as chapter 1 through 4. Formisano’s focus on 
antipartisanship, connections to the Revolutionary generation, and attempts to delegitimize political opponents 
mostly during the first two-party system proved instrumental in helping flesh out the contours of my work. 
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some of the broader contours of early American political culture, most noticeable the 
foundational premise of a two-party system. As the start of the Civil War, eastern 
Pennsylvanians cast the Confederacy as disloyal, maintaining the two-party framework, but as 
opinions over the conduct of the war diverged in the North, regional partisans translated the 
rhetoric of disloyalty into their interior political workings, casting political opponents as disloyal. 
While these actions retained some elements of antebellum political culture, we should not 
assume that the language of loyalty and the Civil War simply replicated the rhetoric of the 
preceding decades. Certainly, eastern Pennsylvania offered many similarities, but they also 
offered their fair share of differences. The context of the Civil War is the most significant 
departure from the antebellum period. The severing of the nation, the possibility of destruction 
(physical and national), and the sheer scale of the war presented Americans with a completely 
different experience from the political conflicts of the early 1800s. Within this new context, a 
tangible moment appeared where the language of national loyalty took on a new, more 
threatening meaning. The political behavior of eastern Pennsylvanians revealed how the Civil 
War nearly destroyed the experiment of democracy in the North. As a side effect of this 
intensified political rhetoric, eastern Pennsylvanians came to see that national destruction could 
only come from the election of their political opponents. It is important to clarify though, despite 
the professions and beliefs of Civil War era partisans, neither party in eastern Pennsylvania 
endeavored to destroy the nation. They were at odds on how to fix it, which prompted 
Republicans and Democrats alike to fall back on their traditional political learnings—
delegitimizing their opponents. Or in this sense, they labeled their opponents disloyal.
8
 
                                                 
8
 Formisano, The Transformation of Political Culture,  108; David Waldstreicher, In The Midst of Perpetual Fetes: 
The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
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 That context, the potential destructive ability of the conflict, created a unique outcome of 
the loyalty debate: a crisis of democracy. Although contemporaries failed to use such a phrase, it 
serves as a tidy way to encapsulate their sentiments. They certainly expressed concern over the 
perils of the Civil War. Specifically, as the war pressed on and changed (including the expansion 
of federal power, emancipation, conscription), local residents began to see their political 
opponents as legitimate threats to their nation. Democrats and Republicans eventually saw the 
democratic process as not only the means of saving the nation (through the election of their 
party) but also as holding the potential for its destruction (through the election of their 
opponents).  
Historians have studied loyalty in the past, but have spent most of that time 
retrospectively trying to prove the loyalty of a specific political or ethnic subgroup during the 
war. Frank Klement’s scholarship typified this line of historiography; he focused on proving that 
Copperheads, the anti-war, anti-Lincoln branch of the Democrat Party, were actually loyal 
Americans during the Civil War. This interpretation countered preceding historians who argued 
that Northern dissidents during the war were disloyal and traitorous elements intentionally 
subverting the Union war effort.
9
 But such scholarship, while informative, has had a distracting 
effect that remains unresolved. Other historians, such as Arnold Shankman, Grace Palladino, and 
Robert Sandow, followed Klement’s lead in their attempts to disprove the label of disloyalty 
attached to various segments of Pennsylvania’s population. While all three studied loyalty within 
the Keystone State, again they mostly tried to prove the loyalty of the state’s dissenting elements, 
                                                 
9
 Frank L. Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 134-
155, 182, 205, 239-41. Klement specifically countered the arguments of historians such as Wood Gray’s The Hidden 
Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads and George Fort Milton’s Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column. 
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whether they were Irish miners or Appalachian farmers.
10
 Each scholar provided illuminating 
works, which greatly improved our knowledge of wartime dissenters, but failed to push the use 
of loyalty beyond a narrow, binary approach that retrospectively argued for the loyalty of 
specific groups during the war years. The goal should not be to prove who was loyal—in fact it 
is impossible to prove because both parties stressed their own loyalty at the expense of their 
political opponents. It was common practice throughout antebellum and Civil War America to 
legitimize one’s own party while delegitimizing their opponents. Instead, historians should focus 
on how ordinary individuals conceptualized and used loyalty in their daily lives.  
In order to understand the how of loyalty, there are a number of other ‘historiographies’ 
at play within this text, predominately focused on nineteenth century political culture. To move 
beyond an either-or paradigm of loyalty, I borrowed extensively from the methodology and 
findings of recent historians of nineteenth-century political culture such as Elizabeth Varon, 
Mark Neely, Adam I. P. Smith, Melinda Lawson, David Waldstreicher, Ronald Formisano, and 
others. Varon offered a conceptual framework in her examination of how nineteenth century 
                                                 
10
 Shankman, Palladino, and Sandow each studied Pennsylvania, but provided different arguments about the state. 
Shankman broadly compared the intensity of Pennsylvania’s anti-war movement to that of the Midwest and New 
York. Like Klement, Shankman argued that Copperheads were loyal and posed little threat to the Union war effort. 
Palladino looked at Carbon, Luzern, and Schuylkill Counties in Pennsylvania (the coal mining region of 
Pennsylvania) and argued that the predominately German and Irish miners in the region acted loyally during the 
war. The miners protested for increased wages as inflation occurred during the war and wartime coal profits rose. At 
roughly the same time, these three counties resisted conscription as well. Republicans and mine owners interpreted 
this as the same resistance to the war, but Palladino argued that there were separate issues and that the miners acted 
loyalty because they wanted a fair increase in pay and were not working with the South to overthrow the North, as 
Republicans accused. Lastly, Sandow argued that resistance in north-central Pennsylvania, the Appalachian lumber 
region, resisted the war due to pre-war economic conditions. Prior to the war, outside companies took over the 
lumber industries that farmers relied on to support their finances. When the courts and violence failed to return 
control of the lumber industry to miners, the farmers and people of north-central Pennsylvania distrusted outside 
intervention. During the war, this prompted resistance to the Republican administration and its centralization of 
federal power. Sandow concluded that these Pennsylvanians were loyal although they resisted the Lincoln 
Administration, because they did not support the Confederacy, but resisted wartime policies out of an extension of 
pre-war conditions. Grace Palladino, Another Civil War: Labor, Capital, and the State in the Anthracite Regions of 
Pennsylvania, 1840-1868, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Robert Sandow, Deserter Country: Civil 
War Opposition in the Pennsylvania Appalachians, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009); Shankman, The 
Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement. 
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newspaper editors and politicians used the term “disunion.” She offered historians a means to 
conceptualize how Americans before and during the Civil War deployed a specific phrase and its 
cultural resonances.
11
 Smith and Lawson produced foundational studies of wartime loyalty—
actually defining how Northerners saw loyalty, not just whether or not certain segments of the 
population were loyal. Smith argued that members of the Union Party (Republicans and War 
Democrats bound together in the hopes of crushing the Confederacy) placed unconditional, 
nonpartisan support of the government at the heart of their definition of loyalty.
12
 In a different 
vein, Lawson urged that definitions of wartime loyalty built on the antebellum connections 
between nation and party, in which both Democrats and Republicans viewed partisan affiliation 
as a key component of an individual’s loyalty.13 Lawson and Smith demonstrated the 
connectivity between Civil War politics and the conceptualization of loyalty. In short, 
participants conflated partisan loyalty as an expression of national loyalty or disloyalty. 
Waldstreicher, Formisano, and Neely proved instrumental in forming a bare bones 
construction of political culture in the decades leading to the Civil War. Formisano (along with 
Neely and Adam I. P. Smith) demonstrated that antipartisanship, connections to the Founding 
Fathers and the Constitution, as well as attempts to legitimize one party, were key constructs of 
antebellum political discourse.
14
 Waldstreicher, through his own publications and edited 
volumes, highlighted a broader range of activities, events such as parades, toasts at receptions, 
                                                 
11
 Elizabeth Varon, Disunion!: The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789-1859, (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2008). Varon argued that nineteenth century Americans used “disunion” in five specific ways: 
as a Prophecy, Threat, Accusation, Process, or Program. 
12
 Adam I. P. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
13
 Melinda Lawson, Patriot Fires: Forging a New American Nationalism in the Civil War North, (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2002), 10-1, 65-97. 
14
 Formisano, The Transformation of Political Culture, 14, 27, 30; Neely, The Union Divided: Party Conflict in the 
Civil War North, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 8, 13, 27;  Smith, No Party Now, 5, 12, 15, 68-73. 
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and gift giving that held political meaning.
15
 Such examples allowed me to realize how other 
events (like parades or flag presentations) embedded loyalty into the daily political life of eastern 
Pennsylvania.  
Neely also added depth to my understanding of a two-party system that hampered the 
Union war effort.
 16
 The old argument—proposed by David Potter, established by Eric 
McKitrick, and condoned by recent historians—was that the North’s two-party system conferred 
great advantages on the Union war effort. That system served as a means for Northerners to 
channel their frustrations, blow off steam, but also hone their focus. In comparison to the 
Confederacy, which lacked an established opponent to the dominance of the Democratic Party, 
their system lacked the ability to organize the energies of their people and contain their 
disagreements.
17
 Neely challenged that traditional line of thought, arguing that the disagreement 
and divisions caused by divergences of opinions amongst Northern politicians actually distracted 
the Union. Nonetheless, I disagree with some of Neely’s assertion that the two-party system was 
defunct in the years leading up to the Civil War. While certainly the collapse of the Whig Party 
in the 1850s gave Democrats considerable influence, a string of smaller second parties (and even 
some third tier ones) rose and fell during the decade.
18
 This is true, yet, I found that eastern 
Pennsylvanians relied on the structure of a two-party system, a framework engraved in them 
throughout the early parts of American history. They used the contours of a two-party system to 
                                                 
15
 Waldstreicher, In The Midst of Perpetual Fetes, particularly chapter 1. 
16
 Neely, The Union Divided, 3-4, 179-89. 
17
 Eric McKitrick, “Party Politics and the Union and Confederate War Efforts,” in William Nisbet Chambers and 
Walter Dean Burnham, eds., The American Party System: Stages of Development, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1967); James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988), 690; Phillip Shaw Paludan, A People’s Contest: The Union & Civil War, 1861-1865, 2nd Edition, (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University of Kansas, 1996), 89. 378. Neely and Adam I. P. Smith have gone to lengths to challenge this 
idea that the two-party system helped the Union War effort, to which I also add my voice. Neely, The Union 
Divided, especially chapter 7; Smith, No Party Now, 154-61. 
18
 Neely, The Union Divided, 7-8, 33-4, 174.  
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form and implement their definitions of loyalty.
19
 The result of such usage was that eastern 
Pennsylvanians hardened political divisions in the region, providing the foundations of a bitter 
division that permeated wartime and post-war politics in the region.  
 Tangentially connected to the discussion of political culture, my research also touches 
upon another aspect of nineteenth-century United States historiography: how did people explain 
what it meant to be an American. Much of the recent literature put forth by American historians 
discussed how individuals envisioned their status as Americans. These examinations include a 
gambit of different works, such as Ann Fabian’s focus on phrenology and  scientific racism, 
Kariann Yokta’s attention to how early Americans mirrored British customs and styles, but 
attempted to break from those practices, and participation in reform movements as Bruce Dorsey 
demonstrated. Regardless of their differences, they all constituted avenues of defining what it 
meant to be an American.
20
 The contentious use of loyalty in eastern Pennsylvania offered 
another arena in which Americans argued about who belonged in or out of American society.  
Their use of loyalty, in which one party asserted who should have political control over the 
Union war effort, also made the case for who should or should not be deemed worth of American 
liberties. 
                                                 
19
 I adopted this idea from Formisano’s The Transformation of Political Culture when he noted that “Both sides[ 
Federalists and Republicans], furthermore, tried to stigmatize their opponents as illegitimate” through a variety of 
nicknames and accusations. Republicans and Democrats implemented a similar line of discourse during the Civil 
War. In essence, Formisano’s comment on America’s early political system helped framed the idea that in order for 
one party to present themselves as legitimate (or in my case loyal), they needed something illegitimate (or disloyal). 
Formisano, The Transformation of Political Culture, 108. 
20
 To list but a few of the works that revolve, on some level, about the meaning of being an American in the 
nineteenth century: Bruce Dorsey, Reforming Men & Women: Gender in the Antebellum City, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002); Anne Fabian, The Skull Collectors: Race, Science, and America’s Unburied Dead, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), Karl Jacoby, Shadows at Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the 
Violence of History, (New York: Penguin Books, 2008); David Jaffee, A Nation of New Goods: The Material 
Culture of Early America, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Stephen Kantrowitz, More Than 
Freedom: Fighting for Black Citizenship in a White Republic, 1829-1889, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012); 
Varon, Disunion; Kariann Akemi Yokota, Unbecoming British: How Revolutionary America Became a Postcolonial 
Nation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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 With this literature in mind, there are really two broad conclusions from my study of 
loyalty in Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and Northampton Counties. The first is predominantly 
conceptual, in that I advocate a different approach to the topic of loyalty in Civil War 
scholarship. Historians have largely treated loyalty within a binary framework, in that individuals 
could only be loyal or disloyal and the historians’ job is to identify and categorize participants. 
Such a treatment of the concept in a historical sense greatly diminishes the complexity of loyalty. 
Loyalty was a lens through which men and women viewed the Civil War. Republicans and 
Democrats alike asserted their loyalty while they denounced that of their opponents. Therefore, 
historians should refrain from casting one political group (or ethnicity, gender, race or any 
particular means of classification) as strictly loyal and the other disloyal. Instead, they should 
focus on how people’s definitions of loyalty influenced their experience with the war itself.  
 This reconceptualization of loyalty leads directly into the next major point of my 
research: the meaning and use of loyalty in partisan discourse of eastern Pennsylvania. Two 
iterations of loyalty ran through the region between 1861 and 1865. In the first year and a half of 
the war, local individuals presented loyalty as a unifying principle that aligned Northerners as 
loyal and the Confederacy as disloyal. That division was not perfect. Early in the war, newspaper 
editors implemented the concept of loyalty as a political tool to support their vision and 
strengthen their party. Democratic and Republican editors by May of 1861 began to accuse their 
opponents of disloyalty, while they simultaneously affirmed their loyalty. Republican editors 
claimed they desired perfect support of all wartime policies, while Democratic editors proposed a 
version of loyalty that adhered strictly to the Constitution, returning the nation to a status quo 
antebellum. As the war grew longer, the Lincoln Administration took harder steps to ensure the 
Union’s victory. This included the restriction of civil liberties, the introduction of conscription, 
11 
 
and most importantly, the emancipation of Southern slaves. Each of these actions, undertaken by 
Union officials to help win the war, served as evidence of disloyalty to Democratic editors in 
eastern Pennsylvania. In turn, they increasingly criticized the Lincoln Administration. This 
criticism proved for their Republican counterparts that local Democrats were disloyal. Eventually 
the language of derisive loyalty seeped into the discourse of ordinary men and women 
throughout the region around the fall of 1862. Soldiers, civilians, and editors began privileging 
partisan affiliation as the main indicator of loyalty. The result was a crisis for democracy in the 
elections of 1863 and 1864, where eastern Pennsylvanians came to view the election of their 
partisan challengers, what they saw as disloyal elements of society, as the threat to the nation, its 
restoration, and durability.  
 The findings of this project are suggestive in scope. My examination of Berks, Bucks, 
Lehigh, and Northampton Counties does not represent the entirety of the North, the Border 
States, and of course the eleven southern states that joined the Confederacy. However, I believe 
that a study focused more on the what and how of loyalty, rather than the who, begins to reorient 
and complicate our understanding of the Civil War. The issue of wartime loyalty permeated the 
daily lives of eastern Pennsylvanians and shaped their experience with the war. They built off 
their established understandings of antebellum political culture, but their use of loyalty also 
produced a break from the past. Within the volatile context of the Civil War, men and women’s 
use of loyalty offered a dire moment for the future of the nation, one that prompted intense 
debate and division about who had the nation’s best interests in mind. Understanding the use of 
loyalty as a complicated and intricate concept that individuals implemented to understand the 
sectional conflict helps us understand how dangerous the Civil War was to all its participants, 
North and South.  
13 
 
Chapter One 
Unity Unfulfilled: The Wartime Construction of Loyalty in Eastern 
Pennsylvania, 1861-1862 
 On September 19, 1861, Lewis Gordon, the proprietor of the pro-Republican Easton Free 
Press published part of a letter sent to his office from a local volunteer, Captain J. J. Horn of the 
12th Pennsylvanian Reserve Corps. Camped near Washington D. C., Horn penned a typical letter 
that described camp life, the drills of the Union Army, as well as the prospects of a Confederate 
attack against the Union capital, which he deemed unlikely. At the end of the letter though, Horn 
combined a discussion of the war, politics, and loyalty into one scintillating paragraph. In his 
conclusion, Horn rebuked “northern sympathizers,” those Democrats he believed supported the 
Confederacy for their recent countywide meeting on August 19. Reflecting on the Democratic 
meeting in his native Northampton County that ended in a violent clash between local residents, 
Horn believed “there are still worse traitors [in Easton] than here” at the front. If “the men who 
composed that meeting…elect” a county or state ticket “I shall class my own native county in the 
same catalogue with secession counties here [in Virginia].” Horn positioned local Democrats, the 
“northern sympathizers” who opposed the war, as a dangerous entity, equal in disloyalty, and 
more loathsome than the actual Confederates who seceded and took up arms against the United 
States. In the end, Horn hoped that his home county would “elect to office good Union men 
without distinction of party” but no “northern sympathizer,” because it would serve as a disgrace 
to both the county and the Union.
23
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 Horn’s letter and its appearance in the Free Press was part of the debate over loyalty that 
transpired throughout Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and Northampton counties in eastern Pennsylvania 
during the Civil War. The publication of Horn’s letter in a local Republican paper illuminated 
three key aspects of the conflict over loyalty. First, Horn’s desire for the election of a nonpartisan 
“Union” candidate reflected a desire amongst the region’s soldiers and civilians for a unified, 
apolitical vision of the war that only sought to restore the Union and the Constitution. For the 
first sixteen months of the Civil War, this apolitical, unifying sentiment dominated the 
sentiments of most, but not all, individuals in eastern Pennsylvania. Second, Horn’s animosity 
towards Democrats in Northampton County, demonstrated that the interjection of politics into 
the discussion of loyalty fragmented any impetus for unity. Lastly, the appearance of Horn’s 
letter in the Free Press highlighted the importance of newspapers as a medium in the political 
debate over loyalty. Newspapers and their editors served as mouthpieces for local political 
parties, facilitated the transmission of information and conducted much of the debate about 
loyalty between political parties and later local residents.
24
 From the onset of the conflict, 
soldiers and civilians in eastern Pennsylvania cast the war, in all its aspects, as part of a narrative 
about loyalty in the face of rebellion and secession. Loyalty however, was a broad concept, one 
malleable and open to interpretation for local residents. Early in the war, two divergent visions of 
loyalty developed, one amongst the citizenry who sought to build unity and another amongst 
newspaper editors that generated division. In this light, citizens of these counties manifested two 
components of antebellum political culture in their discourse over loyalty. The first was an 
                                                                                                                                                             
August 24, 1861; The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 1861-1865, (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University 
Press, 1980), 73. 
24
 Adam I.P. Smith and Jeffrey Pasley both noted the importance of newspapers to the discussion andspread of 
political ideas. Smith noted that in nineteenth century and Civil War America, the circulations of newspapers were 
small, but that most towns or cities had one paper for each of the two main parties, while Pasley noted that in the 
Early Republic, newspapers served as the only place where “ideas, attitudes, policies, and candidates” came together 
“under the party label.” Pasley, “The Cheese and the Words,” 41; Smith, No Party Now, 79. 
15 
 
antipatisan distrust of political parties, especially in the face of secession. On the popular level, 
amongst soldiers and civilians, antipartisan unity found a stronger foundation than amongst 
newspaper editors. Partisan mouthpieces, although they preached unity at the onset of the 
conflict, by May 1861, slipped back into the second continuation of political culture, which was 
bitter criticism of their opponents, couched in the language of loyalty. By the fall of 1862, 
soldiers and civilians joined in a contentious use of loyalty.  
Against this backdrop, the focus of my argument is to move our analysis away from 
trying to determine who was loyal during the war and instead explain how ordinary individuals 
envisioned loyalty. To accomplish this I aim to demonstrate three key elements of the loyalty 
debates in eastern Pennsylvania: the ways in which ordinary individuals used and understood 
loyalty during the war, how newspaper editors politicized and intensified the debate over loyalty, 
and how those virulent discussions of loyalty generated a crisis for American democracy.  
Loyalty was more than just a state of being for Americans during the Civil War; it was a concept 
and lens through which individuals viewed wartime politics. The period between April 1861 and 
the fall of 1862 was the first stage in the construction of loyalty, where that concept began as a 
unifying principle for eastern Pennsylvanians in support of the government, but due to the 
incursion of politics, became derisive. This first stage of loyalty is crucial to understand how 
ordinary citizens of both political parties, used the concept differently throughout the conflict. 
Because at the start there was unity, but as the war continued and transformed into a “hard war,” 
including emancipation as well as the curtailment of civil liberties, the desire for unity fell apart. 
The unfulfilled push for nonpartisan unity created a crisis for democracy, where in the later parts 
of the war, individuals saw their political opponents as a threat to the nation.  
16 
 
In order to understand how the effort to build unity actually drove people apart, we must 
turn our attention to the use of loyalty by ordinary civilians and soldiers from Berks, Bucks, 
Lehigh, and Northampton counties. During the early stages of the Civil War, the residents of 
eastern Pennsylvania produced a version of loyalty, devoid of politics, national in scope, but 
sectional in practice, that urged a united war effort to crush the Confederacy. The response of the 
local citizenry who raised troops, donated money, and offered supplies to support the war effort 
in the immediate aftermath of the attack on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, mirrored the 
traditional narrative of the North’s response to the onset of the Civil War. Historians such as 
James McPherson, Philip Shaw Paludan, and Allen Guezlo in their syntheses of the Civil War 
era presented the start of the war in the North as a moment of unity when Northerners came 
together as a wave of patriotism swept over the country.
25
  In the words of Thomas Jackson, an 
English-born abolitionist from Reading with a fiery disposition, this unanimity did occur in 
eastern Pennsylvania.”[W]hen the rebellion first broke out” he wrote his cousin in England, “the 
northern people were united in the determination to support the national government and put [the 
rebellion] down, and for a time, party lines seemed to be entirely forgotten.” 26  Jackson revealed 
a moment at the onset of the war where eastern Pennsylvanians came together and rallied around 
a singular, nonpolitical version of loyalty. Three types of events—War Meetings, the 
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participation of women, and the defense of a locality’s loyalty—between 1861 and early 1862 
illuminate how common men and women attempted to construct that nonpartisan version loyalty. 
The chronology here is important, because at the beginning of the war, civilians, soldiers, 
and newspaper editors all professed unity, yet those statements unraveled at different speeds. By 
the middle of May 1861, newspaper editors began to criticize and hint at the disloyalty of their 
opponents. Soldiers and civilians, with a few exceptions, maintained the rhetoric of unity and 
nonpartisanship until the fall of 1862. Both actions, though editors and ordinary civilians 
diverged from one another early in the war, conformed to traditional partisan culture. Newspaper 
editors maintained the structure of debate in a two-party system, while local residents called 
upon unity and the language of nonpartisanship (including connections to the Revolutionary 
generation and Constitution). This divergence however calls into question the depth of 
nonpartisan sentiments amongst eastern Pennsylvanians. The best way to understand this process 
is to explore how civilians used loyalty alongside the use of soldiers and newspaper editors. 
Eastern Pennsylvanians hosted large, nonpartisan war meetings twice between the spring 
of 1861 and the fall of 1862: at the immediate onset of the war in April 1861 and in the summer 
of 1862 after the Army of the Potomac failed to capture Richmond during the Seven Days 
Battles.
27
 Local organizers hosted these meetings often, but not exclusively, in the larger urban 
centers of each county, and represented an opportunity to bring the people of the region together 
for a display of support, irrespective of political party, for the Union war effort. Regardless of 
when or where local officials held these meetings, they operated under a similar system. A call 
went out in the local newspapers that urged residents to attend the meeting. During that meeting, 
                                                 
27
 Berks & Schuylkill Journal, April 20, 1861, July 12, 1862; Easton Sentinel, July 24, 1862; Easton Free Press, 
April 18, 1861; Northampton County Journal, April 17, 1861, July 30, 1862; Reading Gazette and Democrat, 
August 30, 1862. 
18 
 
prominent men, such as political office holders, newspaper editors, or businessmen, elected an 
executive panel that crafted resolutions to indicate the people’s support for their soldiers, the 
Union, and the war. Each meeting declared a sentiment akin to that of the residents of Reading in 
April 1861, who proclaimed “an undying devotion to the Government and Constitution of the 
United States.”28 In addition to their professions of nonpartisan, patriotic support for the 
government, each of these meetings appealed directly to the legacy of the Revolutionary 
generation. Whether the resolutions passed at these meetings called on local residents to 
preserve, “the previous free institutions handed down to us from our Revolutionary sires” or 
fight in memory of the blood shed by the soldiers of the Revolution, they drew on a usable past 
that was apolitical and attempted to pull local residents together in support of the Union.
29
  
Mass war meetings held in Easton, Reading, Allentown, and Doylestown certainly 
brought out a wide range of spectators, but a careful examination of the individuals elected to run 
these meetings reveal that it was predominately a male dominated activity. The list of the officers 
elected to coordinate these meetings came from a wide selection of persons with local 
distinction, either politically, economically, or legally. While men dominated the organization 
and conduct of these meetings, women most certainly attended as well, though their presence in 
the loyalty debates often took a less outspoken mode. One of the most common ways that 
women participated in the discussion of national loyalty was through the presentation of flags to 
soldiers in the field. Flags were another example of a useable past serving as a physical link 
between home and the front. A specific instance of the presentation of a flag occurred in 
November 1862. Stationed at Maryland Heights, Virginia, near Harpers Ferry, Captain John 
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Dillinger from Lehigh County wrote a letter home to thank two women for their generous 
donation to him and his unit. The women, Mary Samuels and Emma Knauss, gave Dillinger a 
pair of handmade gloves, which he was thankful for because it was “very cold here and to handle 
a musket in the cold, it is a hard thing.” Samuels and Knauss also provided Dillinger’s company 
with a flag, which he noted, “now waves on the very pole that the traitor Miles surrendered to the 
rebels” and hoped to bring home in May 1863 when the unit returned to eastern Pennsylvania.30 
The flag Mary and Emma offered to Dillinger’s unit presented an obvious connection to their 
expression of patriotism. They offered the flag as the embodiment of the nation, a reminder of 
home, and a call for a unified war effort. Much like the reflections of the nation’s Revolutionary 
sires at war meetings, the flag served as a unifying symbol of the nation that soldiers and 
civilians, regardless of their political affiliation, could rally around to support and defend. 
Additionally, Dillinger’s positioning of the flag with the reference to Dixon S. Miles, the 
“traitor” who surrendered Harpers Ferry in September 1861, grounded Dillinger’s letter more 
firmly in the discussion over loyalty.
31
 For Dillinger, Miles’ poor military strategy and his failure 
to maintain possession of Harpers Ferry made him a traitor, while the presentation of the flag 
from Samuels and Knauss, represented a loyal action, the antithesis of Miles. The fact that he 
referenced Miles as a traitor, lends credence to the fact that he believed that the two women 
offered loyal service by providing him with gloves and the unit with a flag. Women like Mary 
Samuels and Emma Knauss presented a unified, national connection to their soldiers in the field, 
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which represented their affirmation of a version of loyalty that supported both the men in the 
Union Army as well as the war effort.  
 Women also expressed both loyalty and a desire for unity through the formation of local 
aid societies geared towards benefiting the local soldiers. Supporting their sons, fathers, and 
brothers in the field offered the women another connection to the nation as it went to war. 
Although small in the number of participants, many of the towns and cities across eastern 
Pennsylvania formed these societies to collect food, clothing, and supplies for local volunteers in 
the Union Army. With newspaper campaigns and festivals, such as the three-day Strawberry 
Festival hosted in Easton in June 1862, their goal was to collect food and clothing for local 
soldiers.
32
 Akin to the early presentations of flags, the actions of the aid societies connected their 
participants to the national goal of preserving the Union. The collection and donation of local 
supplies for volunteers in the field certainly tied together the homefront and the soldiers in the 
field. In doing so, it offered women another way to demonstrate loyalty because they supported 
their local soldiers directly. Women also used the endeavors of Aid Societies to represent their 
loyalty, as was the case with the town of Hatborough in the spring of 1862. 
In the early part of 1862, the veneer of unity began to crack. Located in Bucks County, 
the small town of Hatborough came under criticism in February and March of 1862, when a 
group of unspecified neighbors criticized the town of pervasive disloyalty. The defense of 
Hatborough by a local resident under the guise “Loyal” tied the participation of the town’s male 
and female population together. On March 4, 1862, “Loyal” published a letter in defense of the 
small town in the Doylestown Democrat. In that letter, “Loyal” focused on two elements to prove 
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the loyalty of the local town and vicinity: the enlistment of Hatborough’s men in the Union 
Army and the materials offered up through the local Soldier’s Aid Society. “Loyal” equated both 
actions as evidence of the people’s loyalty, regardless of their political affiliation. For “Loyal,” 
an individual’s loyalty came from their actions that supported the war effort, regardless of gender 
or political distinctions. This letter and defense of Hatborough by “Loyal” demonstrated that 
some individuals in early 1862 presented the issue of loyalty broadly in terms of support for the 
war. It was an individual’s physical actions—volunteering and providing supplies—that defined 
loyalty, not one’s political affiliation. “Loyal’s” defense of Hatborough encapsulated how most 
common men and women presented the notion of loyalty during the early months of the Civil 
War. While a majority of the local populace defined loyalty as a unifying principle, “Loyal’s” 
correspondence also demonstrated division amongst local residents, predominately along 
political lines. Hatborough was predominately a Democratic town. Furthermore, “Loyal’s” letter 
appeared in a Democratic paper. We can see from this letter that in early in the war a surge of 
patriotism temporarily elevate bipartisanship to the forefront of how citizens conceptualized 
loyalty. However, the incident at Hatborough also revealed that such cooperation was, in fact, 
only temporary.
33
  
The civilians of eastern Pennsylvania did not own a monopoly on the subject.  Volunteers 
from eastern Pennsylvania also provided commentary on loyalty in two very specific ways. First, 
when men cast their enlistment in terms of loyalty, duty, or patriotic commitment to the nation, 
they mirrored the idea of a singular, unifying definition of loyalty that pervaded the early war 
years back home in Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and Northampton counties. A second and decidedly 
different way that they used loyalty was in an examination of the people and places they 
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encountered as they marched with their various companies and regiments. Early in the war, each 
of these overarching implementations of loyalty stood removed from any political discord that 
developed at home. However, the discussions of loyalty by eastern Pennsylvanian soldiers 
reinforced two important aspects that appeared from the homefront’s use of loyalty. On one 
hand, the soldiers’ conceptions of loyalty expressed the belief that early in the war they desired a 
nonpartisan unity, while on another hand it stressed the fact that loyalty, however broadly 
defined, was a way in which these men viewed the war. 
 When soldiers from eastern Pennsylvania enlisted in the Union Army between 1861 and 
1862, they explained their rationale for taking up arms to their family and friends back home. 
When men such as James Peifer or John Frueauff, and a host of other men donned the Union 
blue early in the war, they portrayed themselves as patriotic, duty-driven, and loyal defenders of 
the Union. Thrice an enlistee in the Union Army, James Peifer wrote to his sister on the occasion 
of his first enlistment and declared that he believed “it the duty of every free and true man to 
defend [the flag] as long as he has the power to do it, And not allow this glorious banner to be 
trampled upon by these vile and vicious traitors, who are seeking to destroy this glorious liberty 
which we have enjoyed.” Like the residents of Hatborough, or Mary Samuels and Emma Knauss, 
Peifer provided the American flag and the nation as a symbol to rally around, unify loyal 
support, and cast his enlistment as loyal. Peifer envisioned himself as an extension of the nation, 
someone who loyally went forth to protect the “Stars and Stripes” and the Union from 
destruction.
34
  
                                                 
34
 James A. Peifer, Bethlehem Boy: The Civil War Letters & Diary of James A. Peifer, Eds. Carolyn W. Able and 
Patricia N. McAndrew, (Bethlehem, PA: Moon Trail Books, 2007), Letter May 6, 1861 to Sister Mary. The “it” that 
Peifer refers to specifically relates to the American flag, so he will use the flag again as a rallying point for loyal 
support, which in his mind is enlisting in the Union Army. Additionally, Peifer originally promised his sister after 
his first three-month enlistment expired that he would not reenlist in the Union Army until he felt the country was in 
23 
 
Peifer was certainly not alone in these sentiments as a number of other volunteers from 
eastern Pennsylvania also cast their enlistment as a sense of duty or a patriotic commitment to 
the nation. Few other volunteers explicitly used the phrase “loyal” in discussion of their 
enlistments, but their use of concepts such as duty and patriotism pointed towards a singular 
commitment to the nation. Like other residents, these volunteers articulated their loyalty in a 
national, apolitical vein. John Frueauff, like Peifer a native of Northampton County, defined his 
early desire to enlist out of a sense of duty. By fulfilling his duty to the nation, Frueauff and 
other soldiers asserted that they had acted loyally. They provided one of the most basic and 
essential actions to sustain the nation: service in the Union Army. His father disagreed, 
constantly challenging his son over his hasty desire to serve in the Union Army. Yet, Frueauff 
maintained that it was his duty to enlist and “but the logical & natural consequence of my 
reasonings.”35 His commitment to serve in the Union Army was an extension of his belief that 
men needed to offer themselves up for the preservation of the nation. In his “reasonings” the 
only true or loyal action for him to take was to enlist and support the Union war effort through 
physical, military service.
36
 Other men, such as William Reichard and Theodore Howell also cast 
their enlistment in terms of duty.
37
 Reichard from Lehigh County often referenced a desire to 
preserve the flag and a sense of duty to the nation as a motivation for his service.
38
  Howell noted 
in December 1862, that despite complaints at home over the costs of paying for the war that he 
                                                                                                                                                             
need of his service. Evidently, he felt the Nation’s call a week later, when he enlisted again. As the war progressed 
and Peifer underwent a year and half long bout with health problems, he reevaluated his desire to be in the Army, 
became critical of the government, but continued to support the Lincoln Administration. In 1864, despite his 
complaints at first, Peifer reenlisted for a third time and served the duration of the war in Sherman’s army as it 
marched to Atlanta.  
35
 John Frederick Frueauff, Freddy’s War: The Civil War Letters of John Frederick Frueauff, Edited by Daniel 
Gilbert, (Bethlehem, Pa: Moravian College, 2006), May 19
th
, 1861 to Parents. 
36
 Ibid.  
37
 William J. Reichard, The Civil War Letters of William J. Reichard, 1862-1863. In Proceedings of the Lehigh 
County Historical Society, Vol. 22, edited by William J. Wilcon, Esq., 136-280 (Allentown, Pa: Lehigh County 
Historical Society, 1958), August  22, 1862, February 11, 1863. 
38
 Ibid., August 22, 1862, February 15, 1863. 
24 
 
and his men “have done our duty cheerfully and without compulsion.”39 Enlistment was 
multifaceted and complicated for the men of eastern Pennsylvania as well as for men throughout 
the North. Loyalty was an important way in which those men shaped part of their enlistment in a 
unifying, non-political message.
40 
 Volunteers from eastern Pennsylvania also used loyalty in another way; they commented 
on the places and people they encountered during their service. As the men marched away from 
home they literally mapped loyalty, declaring some individuals or places loyal, while they found 
others disloyal or as they often noted “Secesh.”41 These men mapped the loyalty of both northern 
and southern locations, identifying places in both regions with loyal support of the nation and 
disloyal treason against the government. At the start of the war, on April 26, 1861 when James 
Peifer concluded a day of marching, he noted, “we must be satisfied here at York. We have our 
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good water, and no pay and plenty of friends. They all go for the Union.”42 Peifer commented 
extensively on the loyalty of the places he visited throughout his service, citing places like 
Winchester and Culpepper, Virginia, along with Cincinnati, Ohio as disloyal places. Other men 
cited discussions with “Secesh” women and men, while volunteers like Louis Richards, noted as 
his unit passed through Hagerstown, Maryland that “loyal people of the place waved their 
handkerchiefs” at the men as they marched down one of the streets.43 Of course, the volunteers 
often made such assumptions after only a cursory meeting with a farmer or as they passed 
through a small town and their declarations of loyalty or disloyalty therefore had the potential to 
be inaccurate. However, the most important aspect about this mapping was not that the soldiers 
offered accurate assessments of the perceived loyalty of the places and people they encountered, 
but rather, that these soldiers processed their surroundings in terms of loyalty. The fact that men 
like Peifer and Richards mapped loyalty at all indicates two important and related concepts. On 
one hand, it indicated that the soldiers from eastern Pennsylvania mentally divided the places and 
people they encountered based on whether or not they adhered perceptually to a similar 
definition of loyalty as the soldier himself. Although these soldiers painted a particular place as 
loyal or disloyal, they actively used their interpretation of loyalty as a filter to understand the 
world around them. Like civilians, soldiers presented a singular, apolitical definition of loyalty: 
these individuals or places supported us as well as our vision of loyalty, while these others did 
not.  Such an either-or paradigm however was part of the conflict that developed out of loyalty. 
Whoever did not condone a soldier or civilian’s vision of loyalty was in fact disloyal. Through 
their attempts for unity, eastern Pennsylvanians established a framework that led to their 
division. 
                                                 
42
 Peifer, Bethlehem Boy, April 26, 1861. 
43
 Richards, Diary of the Militia Companies, Sept 21, 1862. 
26 
 
Just because the men and women of eastern Pennsylvania desired a united purpose did 
not ensure that that yearning translated into complete reality. Even early in the war men like J. J. 
Horn articulated a politicized, divisive version of loyalty. In his letter to the Easton Free Press in 
September 1861, Horn referenced a county meeting from August 19, 1861. On that evening, 
Democrats in Northampton County hosted their annual county meeting, drawing a large crowd of 
Democrats from across the county, as well as curious Republicans and soldiers returned from 
service in the Union Army. The crowd was so large in fact, that the meeting organizers had to 
move the meeting out of the county court house and onto to the nearby city-square. During the 
meeting, the Democrats passed resolutions that affirmed their loyalty, criticized Pennsylvania 
Governor Andrew Curtin for corruption, and pleaded for a peaceful resolution to the war.
44
 
Northampton County’s Congressman, Phillip Johnson then took the stage, where he criticized 
Republicans for starting the war to destroy slavery and defended his actions in Congress. 
Following his speech, when a member of the crowd was unable to ask Johnson a question, the 
meeting erupted into violence between the soldiers and the meeting organizers. After the meeting 
dispersed, a pro-Union mob marched to Johnson’s house with an image of him in effigy, burnt it, 
and demanded a display of loyalty. Johnson professed his loyalty and stuck an American flag out 
one of his second story windows to placate the crowd. Appeased, but not satisfied, the mob 
moved on to the offices of the Argus and Sentinel, which they broke into and damaged.
45
 
 The mob’s target was not incidental: the politicization of loyalty grew out of the heated 
rhetoric and attacks expressed by local newspaper editors. While soldiers and civilians provided 
a singular vision of loyalty, that of national reunification, during the early war months, their 
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writings contained more criticism of political opponents after the fall of 1862. Consequently, 
Horn’s letter to the Free Press, the events of August 19, 1861, and the criticism of Hatborough’s 
loyalty in March 1862 each serve as an appropriate transition from the early war solidarity to the 
more divisive use of loyalty amongst newspaper editors. There, amongst the black and white 
pages of newsprint, where Horn’s letter and discussion of the Hatborough incident appeared, the 
discussion of loyalty developed very differently than amongst the personal correspondences and 
sentiments of the local populace.  
Contrary to volunteers like James Peifer or John Frueauff and residents like Emma 
Knauss and “Loyal” who acted upon a national, unifying vision of loyalty, Democratic and 
Republican editors implemented an antagonistic version of loyalty. Much of the other literature 
on Civil War loyalty focused on one particular party’s position on the matter, either targeting that 
group as disloyal or through a defense of a specific party’s loyalty. My findings however 
demonstrate that like the citizenry of eastern Pennsylvania, members of both political parties 
used loyalty rhetoric as key political tools throughout the Civil War. Early in the conflict, these 
newspaper editors echoed the sentiments of the men and women at home, advocating unity.
46
 
However, that sentiment barely lasted until May of 1861. Within a few weeks of the attack on 
Fort Sumter, newspaper editors from eastern Pennsylvania began to criticize the loyalty of their 
political opponents while they affirmed their own party’s commitment to the Union war effort. 
They abided by traditional partisan practices, which necessitated the contrast of opposites. Like 
civilians and soldiers, newspaper editors generated the image of the Confederacy as disloyal. 
They easily transferred that framework of loyalty and disloyalty onto the political stage as the 
war continued. As a result, eastern Pennsylvania editors demonstrated a significantly truncated 
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discourse of unity, one that quickly fell apart. Therefore, it was in the newspapers, once the 
discussion of loyalty mixed with politics by local editors that the concept of loyalty took on a 
divisive nature. The discussion and subsequent debate over loyalty that played out between local 
editors became a political tool that produced a crisis for democracy.  
The traditional narrative of the Civil War presents a North unified nearly to the man in 
the pursuit of destroying the Confederacy after the capitulation of Fort Sumter. This common 
narrative ignores the political divides replete in the North, especially over the definitions of 
loyalty. The political divide over loyalty emerged from a conflict over how the North should go 
about restoring the Union. Gary Gallagher has argued persuasively that the restoration of the 
Union was the primary goal of the war for Northerners and that emancipation only developed as 
a tangential goal later in the war.
47
 The cry for restoration was the fundamental force that drove 
eastern Pennsylvanians support of the war, but Democratic and Republican editors, despite their 
push for unity, delineated two different working definitions of loyalty. Broadly they desired the 
restoration of the nation, but on a smaller level, they offered different interpretations of that 
reunification. 
In the immediate aftermath of Fort Sumter, Democratic and Republican editors in eastern 
Pennsylvania debated the proper way to restore the Union. At the same time that members of 
both parties labored to construct their definitions of loyalty, they also attempted to reach across 
the prewar political divide to pull members of all political parties together behind their definition 
of loyalty. On the surface, local editors from both sides of the political divide crafted definitions 
of loyalty with a similar message. However, a careful examination reveals an early divide over 
the perception of loyalty.  On April 20, 1861, the Reading Gazette and Democrat wrote “our 
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course is a plain one—and there is only one that a loyal citizen can take…We can know no Party 
but OUR COUNRTY—No duty but obedience to its laws and submission to its authority… [and 
that they would] support the Administration at Washington in all just and constitutional 
measures.”48 Three days later on April 23, the Republican Bucks County Intelligencer similarly 
noted, “All party lines are obliterated, and all declare with a patriotic fervor unbounded, that the 
Union must be preserved, and its enemies routed.”49 The immediate tone of both papers 
articulated that a key prerequisite for the support of the government during the war required the 
relinquishing of partisan politics and the unification of the Northern populace. These comments 
reinforce the conclusions of Adam I. P. Smith who noted that Americans distrusted political 
parties and early in the war pushed for nonpartisanship as a requirement of support for the 
government.
50
 
However, in many respects, those early articles from the Bucks County Intelligencer and 
Reading Gazette and Democrat offered only a shallow reflection of how their editors understood 
loyalty. Underneath the surface of this unifying sentiment, there were important underlying 
differences regarding the conceptualization of loyalty. Democrats, represented by the Reading 
Gazette and Democrat, stated that their commitment to the nation was contingent upon the 
Lincoln Administration’s performance of “just and constitutional measures.”51 As long as 
Lincoln and other Republican leaders operated within the framework of the Constitution, 
Democrats pledged their support to the war effort. Democrats believed that the aim of the war 
was for the complete and unaltered restoration of the Constitution and Union.  However, if 
Republican leaders broke from their adherence to the Constitution, particularly in the pursuit of a 
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war to destroy slavery, Democrats believed that the President of the United States as well as all 
public officials were “a proper subject for criticism at all times.”52 Democratic editors throughout 
eastern Pennsylvania echoed the sentiment that loyalty was about the preservation of American 
government as it had been, perfect and unmolested. Eastern Pennsylvanian newspaper editors 
who supported the Democratic Party planted this theme of loyalty, one to the Constitution and 
Union above all other things, noting that “the Union and the Constitution, [were] more valuable 
than all our treasure; our civil liberties, more precious than human lives.”53 Therefore, while 
Democrats initially supported the government, they loudly reserved the right to question and 
criticize any action taken that they believed fell outside their vision for the war and the 
preservation of the Constitution.
54
 
The belief that they could challenge any policy or action they saw unconstitutional, held 
by editors of the Democratic papers directly challenged the most fundamental construction of 
Republican loyalty. Both the Easton Free Press and Northampton County Journal published an 
announcement from the Union State Central Committee that defined loyalty to the nation during 
the war as anyone who offered “an ardent and unquestioning support to the Administration—
who sustain all measures of Congress for the maintenance of the war-making power—who see in 
the Southern Confederacy, and those who are in alliance with it, the enemies of Civilization and 
liberty.”55 While this editorial appeared in local papers in September 1862 it reflected how 
Republican supporters envisioned the issue of loyalty throughout the Civil War. Republicans, as 
the current occupiers of the White House, viewed the Lincoln Administration and the United 
States government as one entity, bound inseparably together. For Republican editors at the onset 
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of the Southern rebellion, when they physically took up arms against the Union and Constitution, 
there were only two options, “You must either be loyal or disloyal. You must either be a 
defender of your Constitution or a traitor to the Government There is and can be no middle 
ground.”56 Local Democrats, on the other hand, agreed to a single party only on the grounds to 
defend the Constitution, but in the words of J. Lawrence Getz the editor of the Reading Gazette 
and Democrat, on “all other questions of public interest, there will continue to be differences of 
opinion.”57 Getz’s sentiment, shared by other Democratic editors, in turn laid the foundation for 
political confrontation between local Democratic and Republican editors. Democratic editors 
believed they had the right to question their political opponents, while Republican editors 
envisioned an unquestioned loyalty to the Union war effort.  
From our perspective, the language of Democratic and Republican editors appears to fall 
nicely into categories of restoration versus reconstruction. During the war, Democrats adopted 
the slogan “The Union as it was, the Constitution as it is.”58 Such a slogan is typical of a 
restoration line of thinking—Democrats saw the nation as perfect the way it was and believed 
that abolition fanaticism and Confederate recklessness brought on the war. Republicans on the 
other hand, who eventually came to accept the necessity of emancipation, conscription, and other 
centralizing measures as necessary to win the war, are traditionally regarded as 
reconstructionists—willing to rebuild the nation through any means possible. While these 
definitions are accurate in retrospect and reveal the broad contours of how the two main parties 
operated during the Civil War, they are less sound as a method for describing eastern 
Pennsylvania newspaper editors. Republican and Democratic editors throughout the war used the 
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language of restoration, reunification, maintenance, or preservation with less precision. It is hard 
and impractical to divide eastern Pennsylvanian editors along a line of reconstruction versus 
restoration, only because their use of language was fluid enough to obscure such 
characterizations. With that in mind, what we can distinguish more clearly is the ways in which 
editors modeled their wartime discourse off antebellum political culture, but began to transform 
their divisions in the context of the Civil War. 
This distinction over the conceptualization of loyal support represented the first political 
difference that threatened the practice of democracy. Enos Prinzer, the editor of the Bucks 
County Intelligencer, succinctly captured this threat when he argued that anyone “who goes 
moping about with elongated face, anticipating bankruptcy or financial ruin to every one [as a 
result of the war]…is little better than an open secessionist.” The sooner such complainers and 
naysayers were “placed under the ground”, the better he felt it would be for the country.59 This 
was an extreme sentiment, but the underlying sentiment was shared widely. Other editors 
throughout eastern Pennsylvania used the language of disloyalty to attack their political 
opponents.  
The emergence of loyalty as a politically charged element of discussion among local 
editors led to a distinctly different treatment of the subject in the region’s newspapers, as 
compared to how loyalty operated in the streets. Democratic and Republican editors also cast 
loyalty in nationalistic terms. Members of both parties positioned loyalty in the language of 
defending the Union, Constitution, the flag, and the legacy of the Founding Fathers.
60
 The reason 
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for the development of an antagonistic politics of loyalty by local editors stemmed from their 
divergent definitions. Democratic editors believed that they had a right to criticize the 
Republican administration. Therefore, when Republican leaders acted according to their values 
and to maintain the Union war effort, Democratic editors attacked Republicans for centralization 
of power, increased taxes, and the possibility of emancipation. Concerns over the emancipation 
of the Confederacy’s slaves struck at the heart of Democratic versions of loyalty, because they 
believed that the Constitution explicitly protected slavery.
61
 There was plenty of need for 
concern on that account, because each Republican paper in the region eventually concluded that 
slavery was the cause of the country’s ills. While not all Republican supporters advocated the 
elimination of slavery, they noted that they were willing to adopt any policy to end the rebellion. 
If the war destroyed slavery in the process, they did not see a problem with such a 
development.
62
 Yet, a more important point here was that as Democratic editors criticized the 
Republican Party, local Republican editors viewed that criticism as proof of Democratic 
disloyalty. They responded in kind, attacking the Democratic Party and their local editors.  
The contentious discourse over loyalty and visions of the war between newspaper editors 
in 1861 and 1862 occurred in three ways. Regardless of their political affiliation, eastern 
Pennsylvania editors first attacked their local counterparts, then eventually likened the extremists 
of each party to Southern secessionists, and finally directly stated that their political opponents 
were disloyal. The ultimate goal of these actions was to convince the local electorate that their 
opponents were unfit to run either the local or national government to preserve the Union. These 
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were politically designed attacks undertaken by local editors to improve their party’s standing in 
the region. At a time when civil war literally divided the nation, the use of loyalty developed into 
a key element of the political discourse, with the aim to increase one party’s political fortunes at 
the exclusion of the other. This contentious discourse started on a limited scale and expanded as 
the war continued. 
Within eastern Pennsylvania, one of the earliest phases of the loyalty debate was when 
editors specifically targeted their local counterparts. In each county, the editors divided neatly 
against each other.
63
 At times the debate over loyalty came in the form of a dialogue between the 
editors, like when Jacob Knabb, accused the Reading Gazette and Democrat of “backsliding” in 
their loyalty because they discussed partisan affairs at a time when “party should be entirely lost 
in the sight of the party of all true patriots—that [which] supports the Union and the 
Constitution.”64 Getz responded that Knabb and the Journal had no right to question the loyalty 
of his Gazette, noting that his paper loyally served the people of Reading for twenty-one years 
and the Administration was “doing all it can to keep up its own party” while it cut Democrats out 
of political office.
65
 At other times, the debate was less conversational and more directed at 
attacking the other opposing editor.
66
 Their intention, regardless of political party, was to paint 
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their opposition as partisan, focusing on their own political interests, thereby positioning them as 
disloyal. Yet at the same time these editors made the accusations of disloyalty, they also limited 
those claims to select individuals. The rational for such limitations was that editors still professed 
a desire for nonpartisan unity. In order to attract individuals to a nonpartisan interpretation of 
their version of loyalty, editors wanted to target specific individuals, question their loyalty, and 
attract larger segments of the other party to their side. 
Yet as the war continued, Republican and Democratic editors expanded their focus 
beyond their individual counterparts and began to criticize broader segments of the political 
opposition as disloyal. The first step in this direction was to target the extremists from the 
opposing party and liken them to secessionists. Democrats targeted abolitionists and Republicans 
who sought to destroy slavery, while Republican editors focused on any Democrats that 
advocated for peace at any price or questioned the Lincoln administration.
67
 In either case, 
members of both parties conflated specific segments of the opposing political party with the 
rebelling states. Similar to J. J. Horn’s letter at the start of this paper, where he noted that he 
would place Northampton County in league with secessionist counties in Virginia if local 
residents elected a Democrat to office, newspaper editors drew direct comparisons between their 
opponents and the largest agreed upon disloyal element on the continent: the Confederacy. 
Often, editors declared that the Union needed to stomp out “traitors North and South.”68 The 
implication of comparing Republicans or Democrats to the seceded states was intended to illicit a 
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common object that Northerners could agree on as disloyal. At the start of the war, eastern 
Pennsylvanians used events like War Meetings along with a useable past to construct an image 
of the North as loyal and the Confederacy as disloyal. Editors likened extremists of their 
opposition to the rebels because it directly conjured images of traitors and disloyal Americans 
already established by the desire for a unified, apolitical war effort at the start of the conflict.  
In time, eastern Pennsylvanian editors eventually targeted all their political enemies as 
disloyal. As the war progressed and as members of each party infringed further upon the other’s 
definitions of loyalty, whether it was discussion of slavery or criticism of the Lincoln 
Administration, Democratic and Republican editors characterized their opponents as disloyal. 
Local editors conflated the opposition with secessionists and declared that their political 
opponents were disloyal. By the summer of 1862, the limited criticisms of loyalty used by local 
editors at the start of the war gave way to larger and more specified attacks against the other 
party. This form of discourse over loyalty, as well as the attacks on local editors and the 
conflation of political party with secessionism represented a drastically different vision of loyalty 
than amongst the local citizens at their war meetings, flag presentations, or reflections on 
enlistment. The difference was that local editors wanted that definition to benefit their party at 
the exclusion of their political opponents.
69
  
In addition to the direct attacks over loyalty, we can see the attempts to ostracize political 
opponents and create a single, politicized version of loyalty through the language Democratic 
and Republican editors used in their papers. Editors used the language of loyalty in two specific 
ways throughout eastern Pennsylvanian newspapers. The first was the use of derogatory 
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nicknames for their partisan opponents. Editors used these nicknames throughout the war to 
engender feelings of distrust and disloyalty about their opponents. Democratic editors relied on 
names that corresponded to the issue of race and emancipation. As a result, they often substituted 
the term “Abolitionists” or “Black-Republicans” for their Republican counterparts.70 
Comparatively, Republican editors focused on terms that discredited the legitimacy of the 
Democratic Party, using nicknames such as “Breckinridge Democrats” to address their rivals.71 
“Breckinridge Democrats” referred specifically to John Breckinridge, former candidate for the 
Presidency in 1860 and eventual general in the Confederate Army. The intention here was to use 
Breckinridge’s defection to the Confederacy, his literal betrayal of the nation, to infer that 
Democrats were also disloyal traitors. Each example strove to use a single word to position 
political opponents as disloyal entities. A second way that editors’ language created a politicized 
loyalty was their casual references that only a single definition of loyalty existed. Both 
Democratic and Republican used phrases such as “all loyal citizens”, “loyal people”, and “true 
Union men” throughout their publications.72 While simplistic, the use of such phrases suggested 
that only one type of loyalty existed throughout the North. Editors implied that their version of 
loyalty, their views on the war, and only those people who adhered to those principles were 
loyal. These two specific uses of language and loyalty point to the fact that newspapers, directly 
through their debate over the meaning of loyalty and indirectly through their use of language, 
attempted to influence the residents of eastern Pennsylvania into supporting their version of 
loyalty. 
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 As these examples illustrate, partisan newspaper editors articulated a drastically different 
vision of loyalty than that of the local residents. Newspaper editors and the papers they published 
influenced the discourse over loyalty in two specific ways. First, editors served as the 
mouthpieces for both the Republican and Democratic parties in Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and 
Northampton counties. Editors presented the ideas of their party, through their own personal 
correspondences, but also through the publication of resolutions passed at county, state, or 
political meetings as well as through the publication and commentary on political speeches. 
Editors did not necessarily generate political policy, although in Northampton County, the local 
residents elected the Sentinel’s editor Daniel H. Neiman to the state legislature for the 1862 
term.
73
 Yet, largely, eastern Pennsylvania editors did not so much shape policy as they 
disseminated their political opinions to the local populace. Second, by relaying the ideas of their 
own political party, newspaper editors implied that their version of loyalty was correct while 
competing definitions were not. As a result, newspaper editors were one of the primary means 
through which eastern Pennsylvanians learned about the war and how political partisans 
understood the conflict.  
Another way to consider the importance of loyalty as a means of political discourse is to 
understand when eastern Pennsylvania newspaper editors used the term loyalty. Throughout the 
entirety of the Civil War, the discussion of loyalty in local papers developed a clear pattern. In 
particular, the months that surrounded elections, typically July until October or November of any 
year, witnessed multiple and extensive discussions of loyalty in each paper. However, 
immediately following the conclusion of any election and the announcement of the election’s 
results, commentary about loyalty dropped off considerably. Newspaper editors provided little 
                                                 
73
 Easton Sentinel, November 14, 1861. 
39 
 
discussion of loyalty, either defending their own party’s loyalty or attacking that of their 
opponents, between mid-November and February of the following year.
74
 Around the late winter 
and early spring the arguments picked up again slowly in time for local elections and gained 
intensity as the calendar pressed closer to the summer. The Bucks County Intelligencer 
accurately displayed the connection of loyalty to campaign seasons in 1862 when it ran a 
masthead on the first page that read “For the Union and the War—No Compromise or Sympathy 
with Traitors” between July and October of that year.75 The fact that local editors, such as Enos 
Pinzer, J. Lawrence Getz, and William Hutter printed discussions of loyalty around the times of 
elections ties the concept of loyalty firmly to the political discourse of the war years. Therefore, 
local editors not only used loyalty as a political tool to attack their opponents and discredit them, 
but they also presented those attacks around a rigid schedule that conformed to the political 
campaign season.
76
 
As newspaper editors expanded their attacks against one another and the opposing party 
through the language of loyalty, they established the foundation for a crisis of the democratic 
process. These accusations of disloyalty that positioned one party’s interpretation of loyalty as 
correct were political maneuvers undertaken by eastern Pennsylvania newspaper editors. 
Republican or Democratic editors positioned their party as the only loyal party, the only true 
“Union” party in eastern Pennsylvania and the North writ large. As editors increasingly relied on 
loyalty as their language of political critique, they came to see political adversaries as threat to 
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the nation. Eastern Pennsylvanians began to reshape their political discourse, from a two-party 
system that permitted disagreement—in some instances needed that disagreement for parties to 
legitimize themselves against their opponents—to a rhetorical system that associated 
disagreement with disloyalty. This hostility added to a period of contentious American political 
discourse that began before the Civil War. In the 1850s, average Americans and political 
partisans increasingly displayed a derisive form of political debate. Scholarship from the past 
several decades indicate that such discourse was not limited to one part of the nation. Within 
American cities between 1850 and 1865, Mary Ryan demonstrated that physical violence and 
confrontation came to dominate the democratic process as the public transitioned from ethnic 
divisions to racial and political divisions and as individuals strove to establish their place in the 
political process.
77
 Elizabeth Varon likewise demonstrated that the rhetoric of disunion 
exacerbated divisions between the antebellum North and South as well as the fact that 
accusations of disunion continued well into the war years.
78
 Eastern Pennsylvanians 
demonstrated both change and continuity from antebellum political culture. They maintained a 
two-party system, where political opponents needed to legitimize their party in competition with 
a less worthy by still legitimate opponent. They called on notions of antipartisanship and 
connections to the Revolution, Constitution, and Founding Fathers to demonstrate their party’s 
loyalty. However, the context of the Civil War was different. While antebellum partisans disliked 
their opponents and criticized the harm they could do to the nation, the Civil War provided a 
moment where the sentiments of the opposition were no longer just harmful to the nation they 
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could be downright destructive. Newspaper editors drove most of the early conflicts over loyalty 
in eastern Pennsylvania, but that was only a precursor of what was to come.   
 After the fall of 1862 the rhetoric of politically minded, divisive loyalty began to appear 
more frequently in the correspondences of ordinary individuals, soldier or civilian. Changes in 
military policy undertaken by the Lincoln administration sustained this transformation. While 
Lincoln and his generals transitioned the Union Army from a policy of a quick, short war, to a 
“hard” conflict intent on dismantling the South’s ability to make war predominately through the 
destruction of slavery as well as the curtailment of civil liberties played a major part in the 
reconceptualization of loyalty. Democrats responded harshly to the Emancipation Proclamation 
and curtailed freedoms, because in their eyes those actions violated the Constitution. As a result, 
Democratic editors lambasted Lincoln, his administration, and Republicans on a far wider scale. 
They likened Lincoln to John Adams, who they saw as a tyrant with an administration that had 
“usurpation and corruption, official oppression, war against freedom of speech and of the press, 
burdensome taxes, stamp and gag laws, imprisonment for opinions sake, armies of tax collectors, 
abuse of power, and outrageous persecution of all democrats.”79 Republicans and their local 
editors in turn saw such criticism as proof of Democratic disloyalty and treason. They responded 
in kind, further comparing Democrats in eastern Pennsylvania to the traitorous Confederacy. 
After the1862 elections in Berks County, Jacob Knabb noted that while loyal men went off to 
fight and put “down this infamous Rebellion of the Breckinridge party against the Government, 
the Breckinridge party in the North, have staid at home to aid their brethren by a cowardly and 
bloodless fight at the ballot box.”80 Knabb’s point was that Republicans had enlisted in the Union 
Army in order to preserve the Union, while Democrats remained at home, unwilling to sustain 
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the nation. Instead, he implied, Democrats stayed home in order to aid the Confederacy by 
undermining the Union during elections. For Knabb, Democrats as a whole actively worked to 
sabotage the war effort by not enlisting and voting for candidates sympathetic to the Confederate 
cause. After the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862, visions of 
loyalty began to change and any restraint held by local editors containing the loyalty debate 
dissipated. 
While political discussions increased in their ferocity around the same time of the 
Emancipation Proclamation, the debate over loyalty began back in May 1861 for newspaper 
editors. The discussion about loyalty between newspaper editors helped shift the attitudes of 
local men and women from a unified vision of loyalty to one that was more contentious and 
divisive. The actions of the Union mob on August 19, 1861 in Easton, Pennsylvania targeted the 
offices of both the Argus and Sentinel. The motivation behind the attacks was the perception 
amongst the mob that both papers and their editors were disloyal to the Union war effort.
81
 
Newspapers, in that sense, motivated the crowd to attack what they deemed as disloyal presses. 
Two more examples, from later in the war, highlight the importance placed on newspapers for 
the transmission of sentiments about loyalty. In May of 1863, G. W. Kramer from Lehigh 
County wrote to his friend Henry Hornbeck with the Union Army in Florida at the time. Kramer 
inquired if Hornbeck wanted a newspaper sent to him and if so what kind. If, in Kramer’s eyes, 
Hornbeck wanted a Democratic paper, then he wanted the “Constitution As it is, and the Union 
as it was.” However, if Hornbeck desired an “Abolition Paper” he therefore desired the 
“Contrary, the Union dissolved, and the “Nigger’s” emancipated.”82 Kramer clearly positioned 
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Hornbeck’s choice as a political one. Another example, also from Lehigh County, came from 
William Reichard, when he noted in the winter of 1863 that several soldiers in his company 
received Democratic papers from home. Reichard expressed his displeasure, as well as the 
displeasure of his unit, to his family at home for the insults and slanders of the Democratic press 
from Lehigh County. The unit’s resentment was so strong that they passed resolutions that spring 
which condemned the traitorous language of the local Democratic presses.
83
 Each of these 
examples highlighted the fact that newspapers served as a viable vehicle for the transition of the 
debates over loyalty and provoked strong reactions from residents and volunteers from the 
region. Eastern Pennsylvania newspapers and their editors played an important role in 
transforming the debate over loyalty from an apolitical loyalty based on participation to a 
partisan definition that equated partisanship with loyalty or disloyalty. That transition laid the 
foundation for a democratic crisis because eastern Pennsylvanians came to see their political 
opponents as a threat to the nation. 
 The use of loyalty amongst eastern Pennsylvanians began as an expression of unity and 
nonpartisanship (hallmarks of antebellum antiparty feeling). Soldiers, civilians, and even for a 
fleeting moment editors, positioned the Civil War as a contest between a loyal North against 
traitorous Confederacy that sought to destroy the nation. However, this framework allowed 
individuals to introduce the concept of loyalty and disloyalty into the narrative of the war. The 
definitions of loyalty produced by newspaper editors, while they preached the disregard of 
partisanship, provided a conception of loyalty that challenged their opponent’s definition. What 
transpired was cyclical. As the war continued, growing more perilous with each passing day, 
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Lincoln took steps he deemed would ensure the Union’s victory—the emancipation of Southern 
slaves, the curtailment of certain liberties, and conscription. Democratic editors in eastern 
Pennsylvania viewed these actions as disloyal because in their opinion such actions stepped 
outside the boundaries of the Constitution. As they began to criticize Republicans for their 
conduct of the war, local Republican editors saw such attacks as proof of Democratic disloyalty, 
violating their principles of unquestioning support for the administration in power. As the 
rhetoric of loyalty returned to traditional forms of the two-party system, it slowly influenced the 
local citizenry and set the stage for a crisis, where partisan affiliation would come to represent 
either a threat or a boon to the Union war effort.  
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Chapter Two 
Dangerous Divisions: Loyalty and the Crisis of Democracy, 1863-1864 
“Have the days of the Spanish Inquisition returned?” Captain Joseph A. Frey of the 153rd 
Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiment asked the three-man committee of “The Society of 
Home Friends of the Bethlehem Volunteers” on January 15, 1863. Previously, the “Friends” 
wrote a letter to Frey that questioned his politics and loyalty to the nation as the Civil War passed 
into its third year. The letter angered Frey, prompting a response that he penned to Edward 
Doster, John Lerch, and David H. Taylor, the three Bethlehem-ites who composed the 
committee. He also sent a copy of his letter to Daniel Neiman so that his reply would reach a 
larger audience through the pages of the Easton Sentinel. As a “free white citizen of the U. 
States,” Frey believed that he deserved recognition of certain privileges, one of those being the 
freedom of speech allowing him to express his politics and sentiments about the war effort. 
Insulted “by a set of MEN, mark the words, not gentlemen” who remained at home, replete in 
courage or patriotism so much so that they failed to enlist in the Union Army, Frey proposed an 
alteration to the title for The Society of Home Friends of the Bethlehem Volunteers. In place of 
the word “Friend,” he urged the organization to substitute the term “Enemies” in order to 
produce a more accurate picture of their relationship to local soldiers, the Union, and the war 
effort.
84
  
Frey’s letter serves as a counterweight to the extract published in the Easton Free Press 
on September 19, 1861 from J.J. Horn that criticized “Northern Sympathizers,” the Democrats he 
found lacking in loyalty throughout Northampton County prior to the local election in 1861.
85
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Frey’s criticism of the “Friends” targeted the Republican (or Unionist) populace of Bethlehem.86 
Aside from the role reversal that found supporters of the Republican Party under criticism from a 
Union soldier, the exchange between Frey and the “Friends” more aptly demonstrated how 
extensively the use of loyalty changed after the fall of 1862. Between April 1861 and the fall of 
1862, individuals like Horn, who criticized the loyalty of political opponents, were uncommon 
outside the columns of regional newspapers. Unlike the newspaper editors, average men and 
women from Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and Northampton counties, strove for a singular, unifying 
definition of loyalty and national allegiance. However, as the war continued, changes in 
Republican policies—the suspension of habeas corpus, the introduction of conscription, 
increased taxation, and the announcement of emancipation as a war measure—changed the 
nature of the loyalty debate. These actions specifically violated Democrats’ interpretation of the 
Constitution, representing a fearful and disloyal centralization of power. Republicans believed 
these measures represented sound policies to defeat the Confederacy. After the fall of 1862 and 
the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation, ordinary individuals reformed their views 
on loyalty. Influenced by the derisive discussion of political loyalty from newspaper editors, 
soldiers and civilians altered their vision of loyalty to cast their political opponents not only as 
disloyal, but also as a threat to the survival of the nation.  
In a broad sense, this transformation appeared to rekindle an old pattern, because eastern 
Pennsylvanians in the latter part of the war adopted something similar to the traditional 
antebellum political discourse, which positioned political opponents as threats to the American 
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nation. Yet, this transition amongst local men and women created the central focus of the crisis 
of democracy that developed in later 1862 and carried throughout the war. Context is key, 
because despite the similarities, there was a distinctly different tone present in the political 
discourse after the fall of 1862. That difference the rhetoric of loyalty used by Republicans and 
Democrats in eastern Pennsylvanian pushed the each side to view their opponents in nearly 
apocalyptic terms, because the war provided the opportunity for political adversaries to 
legitimately subvert the nation. Frey’s exchange with the Bethlehem “Friends” is indicative of 
the changes experienced by the local population in 1863 and 1864. His intense resentment, aimed 
at Republicans back home in Bethlehem became the norm for soldiers and civilians.
87
 This 
second chapter will highlight how the use of loyalty went from a unifying agent among local 
residents of eastern Pennsylvania to a divisive concept. Soldiers and civilians demonstrated the 
most dramatic divergence from their discussions of loyalty expressed earlier in the war. On the 
other hand, while soldiers and civilians evidenced a substantial change in their use of loyalty, 
local newspaper editors maintained a steady course. They continued to paint their political rivals 
as dangerous enemies to the Union’s ability to restore the nation. More important than the 
change or continuity express by soldiers, civilians, and editors is the events surrounding the 
war’s latter years in eastern Pennsylvania. Two key political elections, the Pennsylvania 
Gubernatorial Election of 1863 that pitted Republican incumbent Andrew Curtin against 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Judge George Woodward and the national Presidential Election of 
1864 between Lincoln and General George McClellan, dominated the political agendas of both 
parties. These two elections, with the increased discontent among the local populace and 
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continued debate over loyalty by newspaper editors produced a crisis in American democracy, 
because they were major elections during the war. Context was important. In 1861 and 1862 the 
residents of eastern Pennsylvania established foundations for such a crisis when they positioned 
the Confederacy as disloyal and cast their experience in terms of loyalty. In the process, they 
inadvertently created a crisis for democracy, because each side presented elections as enabling 
either the saving grace or the portent of destruction for the nation. Because, as the war 
progressed, the increasingly politicized use of loyalty conjoined political affiliation and loyalty 
for ordinary men and women throughout eastern Pennsylvania. During these elections, ordinary 
citizens and newspaper editors positioned their political opponents as a threat to the Union, while 
their party represented the only possible means to save the country. The result was that the 
democratic process itself ironically became both the path to salvation for the Union as well as the 
means of its destruction. While the general contours of this crisis reflect an intensification of 
antebellum political discourse, the utterly different context of a real civil war made this rhetoric 
much more dangerous. America’s Civil War presented a tangible experience where the 
accusations of disloyalty and the associated destructive possibilities of an opponent’s election 
had a legitimate possibility of irreparably destroying the nation, thereby increasing the hostility 
between political partisans in eastern Pennsylvania.  
Both Democrats and Republicans wanted to restore the fragmented nation, but they had 
different visions on how to accomplish that restoration. Too often, the Republican criticism that 
Democrats opposed the reunification of the nation becomes the traditional narrative. For 
example, Jennifer Weber argues that the Copperheads represented a concerted, effective political 
movement that seriously threatened the Union’s war machine.88 Implicitly though, such an 
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interpretation takes the stance that Copperheads were disloyal. Yet in eastern Pennsylvania, both 
parties advocated for a successful conclusion to the war, reuniting the country. Democrats and 
Republicans both lauded Union military triumphs and bemoaned their reverses. Political discord 
did hinder the war effort, but it took both parties to generate that disagreement and division. 
Mark Neely has noted that the two-party system “was not a vehicle for communication,” but 
rather “Each party and its noisy newspapers constituted vehicles of communication with very 
different messages for the northern people.”89 Eastern Pennsylvanians from either side of the 
political divide constantly discussed their vision of loyalty as the only sure way to win the war. 
Members of both parties wanted the same thing—the Union restored—but they had different 
views on how the North should reach that goal. The use of loyalty throughout 1863 and 1864 
should further demonstrate the need to use loyalty as an organic construct that members of both 
parties used to attack their opponents, as well as an element through which ordinary men and 
women understood the Civil War.  
 In the wake of emancipation, the first place to turn in order to understand the extent to 
which the loyalty debate transformed after the fall of 1862 is to examine the soldiers and citizens 
of eastern Pennsylvania. Around the autumn of 1862 and Lincoln’s announcement of the 
Emancipation Proclamation the use of loyalty amongst the ordinary men and women in eastern 
Pennsylvania began to change drastically. In the field, soldiers still used loyalty to justify their 
enlistment, although this dropped off noticeably later in the war. Those volunteers continued to 
reinforce their patriotic, duty-driven, loyal commitment to the nation, while they also remained 
cognizant of the perceived loyalty of the people and places they encountered.
90
 Similarly, 
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ordinary residents at home maintained at least a superficial desire for unified loyalty.
91
 However, 
collectively, soldiers and civilians began to implement a discourse that used loyalty as a 
politically oriented, divisive concept. We can see this development in two specific ways. The 
first is the insertion of direct, specific attacks levied at political opponents coupled with 
accusations of disloyalty that clearly ushered in new and specific uses of loyalty. A second 
approach is through the language implemented by the residents of eastern Pennsylvania. Much 
like the newspaper editors interjected nicknames and specific phrases to imply loyalty or 
disloyalty earlier in the war, eastern Pennsylvanians adopted similar language around September 
1862, which pointed to this increasingly antagonistic use of loyalty. 
  For most, but by no means all, of the volunteers from eastern Pennsylvania, the 
Democratic Party became the target of the soldiers’ criticisms and accusations of disloyalty. 
Their criticisms against Democrats took on a variety of shapes and forms. Many of the soldiers 
believed that Democrats, or as they frequently termed them, Copperheads or Northern 
Secessionists, were in the words of William Reichard “Traitors at home.” In a discussion with 
his brother-in-law, he argued they “were worse than the rebels, for the latter do their things 
openly, but the former are so base and deluded that they would (as you write) destroy the 
Government rather than see the Republican party in power.”92 Reichard specifically charged 
Democrats with disloyalty. In Reichard’s mind, Democrats posed a threat because if they were 
not in power they would seek to destroy the government. Other soldiers echoed Reichard’s point, 
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noting that they distrusted and feared “Copperheads” because they were a disloyal threat to the 
Union war effort.
93
 The fact that local volunteers viewed Northern Democrats as a shadowy, 
disloyal force that sabotaged the Union war effort signified the transformation of loyalty. Such 
comparisons reflect Richard Hofstadter’s description of a “paranoid style” in American politics. 
Hofstader argued that Americans from the eighteenth century to the present used hyperbole to 
present political opponents or specific groups (Hofstadter’s article cites Masons and Catholics as 
two examples) as a conspiring threat against the nation.
94
 Soldiers reverted to this style of 
discourse, but what sets their comments apart from traditional paranoid style is the fact that the 
Civil War itself presented a potential disaster for the nation. As such, this discourse demonstrated 
three things about the discussion of loyalty later in the war. First, that volunteers expanded their 
vision of loyalty to include the people and politics back home. Disloyalty was no longer just a 
concept that they encountered on the march, but something they could find at home. Their new 
discussions of loyalty drew family, friends, and their local community into the conversation.
95
 
Second, their new use of loyalty demonstrated that the politicization of loyalty had expanded 
beyond the newspapers into the conversations of the volunteers. Much like the periodical 
publications, soldiers began to conflate partisan affiliation and loyalty with greater frequency. 
 Third, the discussions about loyalty put forward by local volunteers were far from 
solitary pursuits. Reichard’s February 16th commentary went to his brother-in-law, but 
throughout his service Reichard also engaged in a series of correspondences with his father, 
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sisters, and brothers about loyalty. At one point, he wrote to his sister Sallie “you ask why 
traitors at home are allowed to print and spout treason; we have often spoken of it ourselves, and 
come to the conclusion that the government is [much] too lenient in its treatment of 
Copperheads.”96 This conversation between brother and sister reveals a great deal about the new 
contours of loyalty. On one hand, Reichard noted, “we have often spoken of it ourselves,” 
referring to the men in his regiment. Soldiers in camp, around their fires, and among their friends 
discussed the concept of loyalty. Likewise, Reichard revealed that soldiers also communicated 
with loved ones back home about loyalty. He was not alone. John Frueauff wrote his parents 
about Frey’s correspondence with “The Society of Home Friends of the Bethlehem Volunteers” 
calling the whole affair “ridiculous” for both sides. He believed that the Society should have 
made more specific charges rather than blanket accusations, but stated that Frey mishandled the 
situation. Furthermore Frey’s “loyalty is very certainly not in my opinion unquestionable.”97 
Like Reichard, Frueauff revealed intra-family discussions of loyalty. He further revealed that 
soldiers categorized the loyalty of the men they served with in the Union Army. Other 
volunteers, such as Philip Melick and James Peifer also noted that political debates raged 
through their units in 1863 and 1864.
98
 Peifer (who also wrote to his sister) noted that the war 
developed into a conflict that could “only have two parties, Union or dis-Union, and the great 
rebellion can only be crushed then; when have put down the traitors we have at home, which are 
worse than the southern.”99 Peifer echoed the language of early war Republican editors by 
adopting a politically divisive approach to loyalty. 
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Other volunteers, such as Henry Hornbeck and Beates Swift, both Democrats, also 
incorporated politics and loyalty into their criticisms of the war. In his diary, Hornbeck noted 
that Republicans practiced “Political Knavery.” In June 1863, they replaced the Quarter Master 
of his regiment with a man “from behind a Counter in a New York Store,” sent to the regiment 
by “those in power, to relieve an excellent volunteer officer. thus are affairs managed at present, 
good Men thrown overboard and Politicians substituted.” The result prompted Hornbeck to 
wonder about the Union’s ability to subdue the Confederate Rebellion “when such glaring evils 
are daily taking place, and of date, More frequent than ever.”100 Hornbeck criticized Republicans 
for their “misrule and mismanagement” as they guided the nation through the war and questioned 
their ability to restore the nation.
101
 Hornbeck’s message was twofold. He believed that 
Republican actions had base political motivations and he believed that Republicans in power 
acted solely to benefit their party functionaries. As a result, Republicans acted disloyally, placing 
party performance over the restoration of the nation.  
Comparatively, Swift, a lawyer by training, began the war as a devout Republican who 
enlisted in the Union Army on August 8, 1862, but shortly thereafter had a change of political 
heart.
102
 His enlistment came in time for him to march with the 129th Pennsylvania to the Battle 
of Antietam. After seeing the carnage near Sharpsburg, Maryland, Swift fell ill, entered a Union 
military hospital, and by December 1862, four months after he patriotically enlisted, he was 
home and in the process of being discharged from the Army.
103
 During those four months, he 
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moved away from the Republican Party, converting to the Democrats and voting for George 
Woodward in Pennsylvania’s 1863 gubernatorial election. Not only did Swift change his 
political preference during the war, but he also hid his newfound political convictions from his 
old friends.
104
 The fact that Swift elected to hide his transition to the Democratic Party represents 
the most compelling aspect of his transformation. It is possible that local residents in 
Northampton County viewed Swift with disdain for leaving the Union Army so abruptly. 
Theodore Howell, also from Northampton County, responded to his wife’s plea to resign and 
come home to their eight children, that “I think it would be to hot in old Allen for me to stop 
long, there has 2 captains resigned in the regiment and their men were very much put out about it 
and I have heard that when Capt Reimer came home his neighbors were very indignant [with] 
him for deserting his men.”105 Although one was an officer and the other an enlisted soldier, 
Howell’s story acknowledges that residents of Northampton County grew disgruntled at the 
resignation of one of their soldiers.  
Swift’s failure to share his political change of heart with friends, along with his 
descriptions of some local residents as “violent Abolitionists,” highlights two other crucial 
factors of the loyalty debate.
106
 First, that at least on some level, Swift felt pressure to conform 
and feared an unspecified retaliation, perhaps social ostracism, from his friends. Furthermore, his 
secrecy and use of the word Abolitionist, reference the contentious atmosphere of eastern 
Pennsylvania politics and loyalty in the latter portion of the war. Swift never provided a concise 
reason for his transition from Republican to Democrat in 1863. His military service was 
obviously a key part of that transformation, but it seems, at least tangentially, that race and the 
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Emancipation Proclamation influenced his decision. Not only did Swift present a clear disdain 
for Abolitionists, but he also had little love for African Americans. When conversing with a man 
in June of 1863, Swift recorded that their conversation turned to African Americans and that he 
favored allowing blacks into the army, an ironic, but malignant concession for an anti-
abolitionist. He “wished they would try them and kill off a few…enough whites have been 
killed…Negroes could be subtracted easier and their loss would not be felt.”107 We can surmise 
that Swift disliked the prospects of freeing African American slaves, viewing such an action as 
clear evidence of disloyalty by the Republican Party.  
There were other volunteers from Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and Northampton counties that 
criticized the war but did not necessarily delve directly into the issue of loyalty, further 
complicating political and personal sentiments about the war. Unlike the soldiers who directly 
attacked Copperheads, the criticism from soldiers leveled at Republicans covered a more 
convoluted spectrum. With anti-Copperhead rhetoric, the discussions of men like Reichard and 
Frueauff had a clear, political target, that weaved together political preference and the issue of 
loyalty in their criticisms. Yet, there were also individuals like James Peifer, the oft-touted 
loyalty mapper, Copperhead criticizer, and Lincoln supporter, who spoke out against the war 
effort for a time. During the year and a half that Peifer spent recuperating in various Union Army 
hospitals throughout Maryland and Virginia, he wrote his sister, bitterly lamenting about his 
second stint in the Union Army. While confined to a hospital bed, Peifer came to see the North’s 
leaders as generally poor candidates for their positions. They butchered soldiers for little gain 
and conducted an “unholy war” that brought destruction to the nation. He developed a strong 
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desire to leave the Union Army and return home.
108
 Of course, Peifer was not alone in such 
sentiments. Other soldiers expressed similar complaints against the management of the war, 
shared a desire to return home to their loved ones, and complained about their service.
 109
 Yet, 
such criticisms raise a conundrum: did a desire to return home or to critique the war represent 
disloyalty? Historians have established that during the Civil War soldiers from both the Union 
and Confederate armies grew weary of service, desiring to return home.
110
 Such criticisms 
therefore did not necessarily represent political condemnation of Lincoln or the war, but rather a 
basic right of soldiers who offered up their lives in defense of the nation to complain when 
military circumstances did not match their expectations. In other words, criticism of the war 
could take many forms, and unlike the Democrats or Republicans who attacked based on 
perceptions of loyalty and politics, other men spoke out against the war or their military service 
for personal reasons.  
Peifer, along with Henry Hornbeck, complicates the use of loyalty, both in eastern 
Pennsylvania and historiographically. While Peifer criticized Copperheads as dangerous and 
disloyal, as previously mentioned, he also entered a stretch of significant criticism leveled at 
Union commanders and officials.
111
 Hornbeck similarly criticized the Lincoln Administration 
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and its policies during the war. Yet, despite such criticisms, both men would go on to reenlist in 
the Union Army, Peifer for a third time in January 1864 and Hornbeck in clear disregard for his 
sister’s requests not to reenlist, did so in February 1864.112 As a result of their complaints and 
then reenlistments, both volunteers complicate our understanding of loyalty during the war years. 
Peifer and Hornbeck were ‘disloyal’ to the standard of Republican newspaper editors who 
claimed that “an ardent and unquestioning support to the Administration” was a key component 
to loyalty, because both men criticized the administration.
113
 Despite their criticisms and 
‘disloyalty’, these men continued to support the war effort by reenlisting, in effect challenging 
Democratic versions of loyalty because both men continued to serve a war that ultimately 
destroyed slavery and reworked the Constitution.
114
 Their actions should drive home the fact that 
loyalty was more than a broad category historians can use to label Northerners during the Civil 
War. Both men would have argued that they were loyal and their actions, both criticizing the 
government along with reenlisting in the Union Army provide examples that clash with either 
parties’ wartime definitions of loyalty. The point here, without taking the discussion too far 
afield is to stress further the futility of defining one political group as loyal or disloyal during the 
Civil War. Peifer and Hornbeck are clear examples that loyalty was a complicated concept that 
historians cannot paint in black or white colors.
115
 Eastern Pennsylvania soldiers, whether it was 
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Peifer, Hornbeck, or one of the other volunteers from the region showed the complexity of 
loyalty. They also support the notion that soldiers reformed their perception of loyalty from the 
early days of the war, incorporating political elements into their discourse.  
Civilians, both the men who remained at home along with the women of eastern 
Pennsylvania, much like their counterparts who donned the Union blue, also exhibited a more 
virulent discussion about loyalty between 1863 and 1864. Although civilians at home left far 
fewer records than their friends and family in the military, their scant records coupled with the 
discussions carried on with loved ones in the Union Army, offer a concise picture of how 
civilians handled the concept of loyalty. While eastern Pennsylvanians still held war meetings 
and organized aid societies, their unifying sentiment evaporated. In the summer of 1863, men 
and women in the region banded together to defend their state in June as Robert E. Lee invaded 
through the Cumberland Valley. They also organized meetings to raise bounties to encourage 
voluntary enlistment, while avoiding conscription.
116
 Despite these gatherings and 
demonstrations of mutual support, discord also grew on the homefront. As a result, civilians 
provided three new developments their discourse regarding loyalty. Ordinary men and women 
openly discussed the concept of loyalty with men in the army, they incorporated an intensified 
version of loyalty into a number of specific actions, and they revealed that sentiments about 
political loyalty affected their social experiences.  
The responses of soldiers to their family members’ questions revealed that civilians at 
home began to discuss loyalty with their loved ones serving with the Union Army. During the 
first year and a half of the war, most talk of loyalty originated from the soldier’s perspective, 
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placing their enlistment in terms of loyalty or mapping the perceived loyalty of people and places 
they encountered. Later in the war, the discussion traveled between the homefront and 
battlefront. When William Reichard responded to his sister, answering her question as to why 
Democratic editors were able to publish “treasonable” materials in March 1863, he revealed that 
his sister inquired about the subject of loyalty and that they shared perspectives on the subject.
117
 
Similar inferences are possible when we take the discussions of soldiers, like Frueauff who 
agreed with his father that “Northern Secessionists” were the most severe threat to the nation.118 
In line with the transformed discussion of loyalty, the fact that civilians also used a hostile 
approach to opposing political parties manifested itself in these discussions. Reichard’s sister and 
Frueauff’s father both felt that Democrats in eastern Pennsylvania were disloyal during the 
conflict. Thomas Jackson, the pro-Abolition, English rope maker joined in this discussion of 
intense, contentious loyalty. Jackson viewed the Confederates as “blood thirsty traitors” and 
disdained them and their institution of slavery greatly, but held no love for Northern Democrats 
either.
119
 Those “secret traitors north”, or as he preferred “develocrats”, assisted with the 
Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863 that ended at Gettysburg.
120
 
Jackson had a clearly negative image of local Democrats and showered abuse down upon them 
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throughout the war, helping create a contentious atmosphere among the local populace. Other 
civilians, both men and women, provided their own commentary on loyalty exacerbated the fury 
of this debate. 
Civilians also engaged this intense version of loyalty through a number of extra-textual 
actions. In May 1863, “A few patriotic ladies of Easton” left a homemade American flag and a 
note at the door of the Easton Sentinel’s office, writing to Daniel Neiman that “We are pleased 
with the noble course you have pursued; endeavoring to preserve the Constitution and restore the 
Union as it once was.”121 When those few “patriotic ladies” noted their thanks and support for 
the Sentinel’s course of action, they entered into both the loyalty debate and the crisis over 
democracy. They simultaneously affirmed their affinity for Neiman’s publications and noted that 
he was part of the Democratic (and legitimate) attempts to heal the nation. Compared to the flag 
given to John Dillinger by Mary Samuels and Emma Knauss earlier in the war, donating the flag 
to the Sentinel sent a clear political message that supported one specific party. Where Samuels 
and Knauss dedicated a flag to a regiment of soldiers, pushing that unifying concept of loyalty, 
the flag from the Easton women firmly supported the Democratic Party. Other women, such as 
Mary Hornbeck who refused to wave at a torch-light procession that brandished the image of 
Lincoln, but heartily waved at one for George McClellan in November 1864 or William 
Reichard’s sister who inquired and discussed loyalty with her brother, demonstrate that attention 
to loyalty was pervasive.
122
 Mary Hornbeck, similar to the Easton women, clearly picked a side 
and demonstrated her loyalty, while Reichard’s sister also implicated her preference. Together 
these women participated in a discussion about the use of loyalty. More important than gender 
inclusivity though, is the amount of attention paid to the notion of a more derisive form of 
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loyalty during the later years of the Civil War. Men and women both focused intently on the 
issue of loyalty and revealed a contentious divide about the concept. 
Nowhere was that contention more evident than in the effects that political division 
imparted on the social interactions of eastern Pennsylvanians. Division, not unity, came to rule 
experience in the streets. In Reading, the county seat of Berks County, the wartime environment 
became so hostile that the city’s residents began to dissociate themselves from one another due 
to their partisan affiliation. John H. Rhoads informed his friend “Dear Doctor” on April 23, 
1863, that on the preceding Tuesday evening a former minster, J. Clancy Jones, hosted a party at 
his house for city’s residents. Yet, Rhoads and Reading’s “Union folks,” be they young or old 
failed to attend the ex-minister’s party. Instead those “Union folks” attended the Grand Union 
Meeting held in the city that evening, which left Jones and the party organizers dispirited. The 
minister had made excessive preparations “to entertain their friends, but we can account for the 
absence of so many person, here it is—the Copperheads were there, and the Union people stayed 
away.”123 Rhoads’ letter indicated that political affiliation formed the foundation for social 
divisions within Reading. Despite his attention to the fact that Copperheads were present at the 
party, it is unclear if Rhoads considered Jones a Copperhead as well. When Rhoads, like 
newspaper editors and soldiers, referenced Copperheads, he invoked the idea of disloyalty, 
especially when he juxtaposed the concept to the “Union people.” Rhoads implied that 
Copperheads were disloyal, while Unionists were implicitly loyal. The party hosted by J. Clancy 
Jones was not an isolated incident in eastern Pennsylvania. The fact that Beates Swift had to 
withhold his political sentiment from his friends in Northampton County revealed that at least 
some individuals feared revealing their political preference thereby avoiding censure or disdain 
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from their acquaintances. Combined with the partisan bickering, name-calling, and general 
animosity displayed through their discussions, the residents of Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and 
Northampton counties highlighted the strained relationship between members of the opposing 
political parties. 
Furthermore, the language used in their personal correspondences, whether it was from 
soldier or civilian, indicated the transition from a unified discourse about loyalty to a divisive 
and contentious use of the term. Unlike the first year and a half of the war, in late 1862 and 
throughout the next two years, men and women from Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and Northampton 
Counties interjected terms such as traitor, loyal, or disloyal into their correspondences, outside of 
references to the Confederacy. They also implemented the use of derogatory nicknames, much 
like local newspaper editors did during the earlier part of the war. Republican or pro-
administration men and women targeted those who criticized the war effort as Northern 
Secessionists or Copperheads.
124
 Those individuals who voted Democratic and opposed the 
administration, such as Beates Swift, targeted their opponents as Abolitionists.
125
 This shift, the 
introduction of discourse about loyalty directed at other residents of eastern Pennsylvania as well 
as the application of derogatory nicknames, indicated an important change in the social and 
political climate. The topic of loyalty not only influenced what people from this region wrote 
about in their correspondences, it also came to signify how they viewed and identified their 
political opponents as a danger to the Union. 
 Where though did these men and women ultimately learn to use such derisive language 
about loyalty in the latter portion of the Civil War? Certainly, at the onset of the war they did not 
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view loyalty in such contentious terms, though their local newspaper editors did. While it is 
difficult to prove the effect local newspaper editors had on eastern Pennsylvania’s population 
and the concept of loyalty, they did play a part. Many residents read the local papers. Even the 
men in the field, through the charity of loved ones or local aid societies, remained tethered to the 
papers. Eastern Pennsylvanians also discussed the contents of the papers they received from back 
home or acknowledged their receipt of the papers.
126
 Even Mary Hornbeck provided 
commentary on the papers, noting that their debates were “shameful, calling each other liars and 
everything.”127  
Yet, did such statements reveal how deeply the editors and their publications influenced 
the thinking of these men and women? Superficially, they did, but with a lack of clear 
introspection by letter and diary writers, such assessments are only tenuous at best. Patterns did 
develop though. It was around March 1863 that Republican editors began to use the term 
Copperhead as a means of describing anti-war Democrats. Soldiers and civilians began to use 
that term around the same time. It is possible that the soldiers garnered this information from 
other soldiers they served with, yet it is equally likely that local papers also influenced the 
introduction of this language into their discourse. Regardless, the fact of the matter is that 
newspaper editors played a role in the development of the loyalty debate, at least prompting the 
response of soldiers in Reichard’s regiment to pass resolutions against Democratic 
publications.
128
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Editors also continued to delve into the realm of personal criticisms leveled at other 
editors. In 1863, Enos Pinzer wrote to his Bucks County counterpart, Colonel William H. Davis, 
owner of the Doylestown Democrat and acting commander of the 104th Pennsylvania Volunteer 
Infantry Regiment. In his letter, Pinzer suggested that Davis return home and wrest control of the 
Democrat back from J.D. Mendenhall, who ran the paper in Davis’ absence. He also subtly 
implied that Davis could not adequately prove his loyalty to the nation when he was not at home 
controlling the publications of his paper.
129
 Throughout the war, Pinzer criticized the Democrat, 
but attempted to maintain a cordial relationship with Davis, minimalizing his attacks on the 
paper’s proprietor, instead aiming his accusations of disloyalty at the paper’s current editor, J. D. 
Mendenhall.
130
 On November 24, 1863, Davis published his reply to Pinzer, declining to return 
home to retake control of his paper. Instead, Davis revealed that he saw his Republican 
counterpart as “not only my political, but personal enemy, for your persistent warfare upon 
me.”131 Evidently, Davis did not believe that Pinzer had kept his criticisms cordial. Instead of 
returning home to take back the Democrat from his replacement (Davis still owned the paper, 
though he no longer controlled the weekly publications), Davis offered “deeds in evidence of my 
loyalty. I have shown my willingness to shed my blood in the cause, while you have, so far, only 
shed bottles of ink.”132 He urged Pinzer to enlist, matching his own deeds with equal deeds of 
action. The exchange between Pinzer and Davis highlighted the divide spurned by the discussion 
of loyalty, as well as the continued conflict between newspaper editors over what it meant to be a 
loyal American in the midst of the Civil War. Davis’ reply also returned to the most basic 
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foundation of loyalty throughout the war: that nonpartisan action, in this case military service, 
was essential. However, eastern Pennsylvanians constantly acted along partisan lines because 
they saw their version of loyalty as the only correct one to guide the nation to a successful 
conclusion.  
Davis’ service and his exchange with Pinzer not only highlighted the continued and often 
personal discord that accompanied the discussion of loyalty among local newspaper editors. That 
exchange also raised the subject of War-Democrats, the members of the Democratic Party who 
strongly supported the war effort, but also resisted some of Lincoln’s more liberal policies, such 
as Emancipation and the restriction of civil liberties.
133
 Very little scholarly work has come forth 
over the past four decades on the subject of these Democrats caught between political parties. 
Christopher Dell’s Lincoln and the War Democrats from 1975 serves as the scholarly treatment 
of War Democrats. In that monograph, Dell provided a top-heavy political history, examining 
politicians and generals he identified as War Democrats. Dell argued that these men played a 
major role in shaping Lincoln’s wartime policy and helped soften conservative American 
traditions because of their support for the war effort and acceptance of wartime policies.
134
 While 
Dell’s conclusions placed great, perhaps extravagant, claims on the importance of War 
Democrats, the issue of this political and historiographic anomaly raise important considerations 
about the slipperiness of wartime loyalty. Davis was certainly a War Democrat, he enlisted, 
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fought the Confederacy, but remained a proponent of the Democrat Party. But what about men 
like Henry Hornbeck, who while a Democrat that criticized the war, remained in the Union 
Army from 1862 to 1865? How do we classify Democratic newspaper editors who professed that 
they wanted to subdue the South, but demanded that their party was the only organization 
capable of doing so successfully?
135
 In part because the lines are so difficult to parse out, 
between the various portions of the Democratic Party, this text focuses only on the larger notion 
of Democrats. However, the shades of grey that stand between a Democrat and a War Democrat, 
especially in terms of loyalty should reinforce the need to view loyalty as a less stringent and 
more flexible concept. 
 Editors however continued to portray loyalty as a concrete concept based on one’s 
partisan affiliation, but like soldiers and civilians in 1863 and 1864, these editors also increased 
the virulence of their loyalty rhetoric. Of course, editors still defended their own party’s loyalty, 
while simultaneously continuing the accusations and criticisms of disloyalty from the earliest 
days of the war. From the autumn of 1862 until the conclusion of 1864’s Presidential Election, 
they relied on undermining their opponent’s definitions of loyalty through derogatory nicknames 
intended to invoke suspicion of disloyalty (Copperhead, Northern Secessionists, or 
Abolitionists), attacks directly accusing political opponents of disloyalty, and conflating political 
opponents with secessionism.  
There were of course new wrinkles to the editors’ attacks. As evidenced by the local 
volunteers and citizenry, Republican editors introduced the term Copperheads.
136
 During the 
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early part of 1863, J. P. Heitrich equated the venom of copperhead snakes, as previously 
mentioned to that of his Democratic opponents.
137
 In response, Daniel H. Neiman of the Easton 
Sentinel and William Hutter of the Easton Argus unleashed their editorial titled “Copperheads vs 
Blacksnakes”, where both editors attempted to vindicate the nickname Copperhead by creating 
an allegory between Copperhead snakes and Democrats, while they labeled Republicans as 
disloyal “Blacksnakes.”138 Neiman and Hutter’s endorsement of the Copperhead label was much 
more than a clever turn of phrase.  It was an attempt to legitimize the Copperhead nickname, 
undermining the potential harm of the Republican moniker, while simultaneously creating a 
diminutive for Republicans. Ultimately, the “Blacksnakes” label failed to catch on in eastern 
Pennsylvania, never appearing again as a viable moniker for Republicans in the region. In 
comparison, the Copperhead label against Democrats maintained its presence throughout the 
North during the war, as well as in the annals of history, as many historians still remember 
wartime Democrats as Copperheads. Despite the failure of the “Blacksnake” label to catch on, 
the attempt to reorient the Copperhead nickname revealed several important items about the 
debate over loyalty. First, that the nicknames used to imply disloyalty held a good deal of 
influence, hence the attempt to unravel the Copperhead label. Second, that the issue of loyalty 
permeated deeply throughout the region as editors attempted to rework nicknames to their 
advantage.  
 The fascination with a snake-based allegory also presented another compelling undertone 
to the loyalty debate in eastern Pennsylvania. Historians have widely discussed the fact that 
Republicans labeled anti-war Democrats as Copperheads. Jennifer Weber’s most recent 
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monograph is titled Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North, Frank 
Klement wrote Copperheads in the Middle West, along with a number of other historians who 
frequently described wartime, anti-Lincoln Democrats as Copperheads.
139
 Yet the traditional 
origin story of this nickname in McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom, and the accepted narrative 
in general, attributed the name to Ohio Republicans in 1861. Later, during the fall elections in 
1862, McPherson noted that a wider array of Republicans implemented use of the Copperhead 
nickname to malign Democrats. In response some resilient members of the Democracy, like 
Neiman and Hutter, tried to regain control of the label as a means to undermine “Republican 
“tyranny,”” but failed to do so as the name gained further acclaim amongst Republicans.140 
While McPherson relegated his description of the “Copperhead” origin story to a footnote, a 
cultural approach should question why Republicans picked that specific term and why the two 
Easton Democrats responded by positing Republicans as “Blacksnakes.”  
Considering a deeper meaning to the imagery of snakes calls upon an early American and 
biblical experiences that painted snakes as emblems of original sin. Thomas Slaughter aptly 
outlined the history of the snake’s malevolence in his reevaluation of Lewis and Clark’s 
exploration of the Northwest. Americans, Slaughter maintained, early in the nineteenth century, 
saw snakes as the embodiment of Satan, capable of ensnaring human souls, and as violent, 
destructive creatures. Although by the middle of the century Slaughter noted the Puritan inspired 
vision of demonic snakes faded away, fear and distrust of the serpents remained present in 
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American society.
141
 With such a rich background, both religious and environmentally, it is 
probable that Republicans, at least subconsciously, drew on the shared history and concern of 
snakes to hamper the Democratic Party. Their aim then was to use the Copperhead name, not 
only to portray a specific group as disloyal, but also to illicit the long-held fear over snakes in 
American history. Hutter and Neiman’s “Blacksnake” rebuttal attempted to latch on to those 
deep-seated fears in response. Much like the concept of original sin, eastern Pennsylvanian 
editors’ used snake-like imagery to describe their opponents as destructive agents, but in this 
case political opponents threatened to destroy the nation, a political Eden. As we have witnessed, 
editors, followed by soldiers and civilians used nicknames to imply disloyalty, but historians 
rarely probed why they implemented those specific nicknames. Considering the deeper history of 
snakes in American culture can at least provide us with a potential answer on that score.
142
 
 The same line of inquiry makes sense when considering the Abolitionist nickname used 
by Democrats to target local Republicans. Instead of calling on environmental or religious 
subjects, Democrats turned to the subject of race to target their opponents. The use of the term 
Abolitionist by editors, soldiers, or civilians, attempted to create the feeling that Republicans 
sought to overturn the accepted racial norms, freeing slaves, giving them the right to vote, and 
making African-Americans equal to white Americans.
143
 Democrats used the Abolitionist label 
to portray Republicans as more interested in freeing slaves than in restoring the Union.
144
 At the 
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same time, editors also recalled the horrors of the Haitian Revolution from the turn of the 
nineteenth-century to illicit the fear of revolt, chaos, and death if Republicans freed Southern 
slaves. Ashli White and Edward Rugemer have both shown that during the nineteenth century 
Americans viewed Haiti with apprehension, fearing that similar events would transpire in the 
United States if the South relinquished the institution of slavery.
145
 After the announcement of 
emancipation, Democrats increased their use of Abolitionists connected to the troubled memory 
of the Haitian Revolution and the constant fear that Republicans meant to make freed slaves the 
political and social equal to white Americans.
146
 Nicknames therefore were a means of 
engendering the sentiment of disloyalty through fear, a clear indication that the discussion of 
loyalty was more intense during 1863 and 1864. Abolition and Copperhead monikers pulled on 
shared American experiences that made white Americans feel uncomfortable, whether it was 
about a slippery serpent or racial change.  
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Regardless of the continued attacks between newspaper editors, their use of nicknames, 
or criticisms of their political opponents, loyalty remained a constant subject for editors to use. 
Through this continued debate over loyalty, newspaper editors maintained the crisis of 
democracy that pitted Democrats and Republicans against one another. Editors continued to 
paint their opponents as enemies that presented an equal, if not greater, threat to the nation than 
the Southern Rebels. 1863 and 1864 presented the perfect atmosphere for the foundations of 
democratic crisis to come to fruition. Residents of eastern Pennsylvania witnessed two 
significant elections in those years, the 1863 Gubernatorial Election that pitted incumbent 
Republican Andrew Curtin against Pennsylvania State Supreme Court Judge George Woodward 
and the 1864 Presidential Election between Abraham Lincoln and Democratic candidate George 
McClellan. Both elections played out statistically in a very similar fashion, with Democratic 
candidates (Woodward and McClellan) receiving majorities in all four counties, ranging from as 
small as about a thousand in Bucks County to nearly six times that number in Berks County, for 
both campaigns.
147
 In the broadest sense regarding the issue of loyalty, the election results are 
less important than the ways in which soldiers, civilians, and newspaper editors invoked the idea 
of loyalty during the elections. Loyalty, and the threat posed by the perceived disloyalty of 
political opponents became the hallmark of the crisis of democracy. Essentially, the democratic 
process, a concept quintessentially American, represented the vehicle through which the nation 
could be saved or destroyed, depending on the election of one party, one definition of loyalty, 
over another.  
This presentation of the Gubernatorial and Presidential elections as keys to the nation’s 
preservation was common among members of both parties and signified one of the fundamental 
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tenets that ran through both campaigns. Editors, soldiers, and civilians all shared an apocalyptic 
sentiment, lending their voices to political campaigns and the crisis for democracy. Local editors 
remained the most prominent advocates for the Union’s survival or destruction in the 1863 and 
1864 elections. Democratic editors painted the political contests as a battle between Abolitionists 
who sought to destroy the Constitution, along with slavery, elevating the African American to 
heights equal of white men, against the pure sons of Jefferson who sought to uphold the 
Constitution. “The Democratic Party must gain power,” in October to “unite what fanaticism has 
disunited—to heal the deep cut thrust by Abolition traitors,” Mendenhall noted in September 
1863.
148
 After Democrats failed to elect Woodward to the governorship of the Keystone State, 
local editors sounded the alarm much like Hutter and his Argus, who identified the Presidential 
Election as the deciding factor in “the fate of the Union, the continuance or discontinuance of 
constitutional government, and, consequently, the weal or woe of thirty millions of free men.”149 
Democratic editors saw Curtin, Lincoln, and other Abolitionists as a clear threat to the Union 
war effort and the restoration of the nation.
150
  
Republican editors sounded a similar tune, but reversed the roles of the parties. Lewis 
Gordon placed great important on Curtin’s reelection in the fall of 1863, arguing that “On its 
result, in fact, the question of whether we shall be a free people…whether we shall be one nation 
or not” rests.151 Likewise, even with Curtin’s success and return to office, the reelection of 
Lincoln the following year was just as important. On the day of the election, Pinzer argued that 
“The day has dawned which is to witness the greatest civil conflict of the country; which is to 
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determine whether the Union is to be preserved and the nation to triumph over faction and 
treason, or whether we shall submit in disgrace to the traitors of the South, and surrender to them 
forever every hope of human freedom.”152 For Republican editors, just like their Democratic 
counterparts, both elections were extremely important, in their eyes, to the preservation of the 
Union.
153
 Men like Gordon, Pinzer, and other local editors continued to embed the language of 
loyalty into the discourse of political elections. It was “Abolition traitors” that damaged the 
nation or the failure to reelect Lincoln that would lead to the triumph of “traitors of the South.” 
In both instances editors they either directly addressed their loyalty or implicated the opposition 
as traitors. They created a rather ironic moment with their use of loyalty amongst the elections.  
At one point, Democratic and Republican editors created a crisis of democracy, because their 
disloyal opponents stood to gain power from electoral success, but that same process that gave 
disloyal elements the hope of success, was the only means to head off the collapse of the Union 
war effort.  
Soldiers and civilians echoed the same belief that the elections of 1863 and 1864 were 
both essential for the fate of the Union. Ordinary men and women commented less frequently on 
the importance of the elections in comparison to local editors. Yet, the residents of eastern 
Pennsylvania also made it clear they saw both elections in stark terms. For the gubernatorial 
contest a letter from a soldier labeled only as JDT appeared in the Doylestown Democrat, writing 
that “I hope and pray to God that the Democratic party may carry the day, for that is the only 
hope and salvation of our country.”154 Likewise, a letter from J. Kempfer noted that “If Abraham 
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Lincoln is elected we will conquer the South, for if they see that we stand united and are bound 
to fight it out they will give in. But as sure as the North elects a Peace President our country is 
ruined.”155 These comments from the men at the battlefront, acknowledge the fact that the 
contention and perceived peril of the election extended beyond the confines of local papers.
156
 
Civilians such as Thomas Jackson also added to this sentiment when he noted that the 
Presidential Election was not just a vote for one office, but for also “whether there is, or ever will 
be again, a united states or not.”157 Jackson, like the soldiers, believed the political contest was 
fraught with dire consequences, a literal depiction of good and evil. The key point to take away 
from the editors’ discussions and that of local soldiers and civilians is that the imagery of a crisis 
for democracy existed at all levels of correspondence and society. Both residents and newspaper 
editors, both explicitly and implicitly, depicted elections in 1863 and 1864 as serious challenges 
to the restoration of the Union.  
This discourse quite clearly demonstrated the fact that competing definitions of loyalty 
divided the political sentiments of eastern Pennsylvanians during both elections. It also revealed 
how men and women viewed the prospects of American democracy as tensions mounted and 
politics grew more divisive. Through an examination of loyalty in eastern Pennsylvania, we 
encounter a rather different form of democracy than in Mary Ryan’s Civic Wars. Ryan argued 
that violence became a staple of democracy around the middle of the nineteenth century, with 
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people clashing over the definition of the “public” and participation in the democratic process.158 
During the Civil War in eastern Pennsylvania loyalty, politics, and democracy coalesced in a 
different fashion. Democracy in many ways became a double-edged sword. It could cut one way 
with the election of one’s own political faction, ushering in the end of the rebellion and the 
restoration of the nation. Yet, the election of political adversaries could also cut the other way, 
dooming the hopes of peace and restoration. Eastern Pennsylvanians emulated the violence of 
Civic Wars in a war of words against their opponents, but also spoke to a greater peril they 
perceived working its way through the political process, the election of their opponents to office 
in the context of the war.  
Regardless of who pitched the idea about an election’s importance or their contributions 
to the crisis for American democracy, they continually positioned loyalty at the center of these 
conversations. Political opponents amidst the crisis were traitors, either to the Constitution, 
freedom, or more importantly, reunifying the fractured United States. When individuals in 
eastern Pennsylvania generated the image that their political opponents opposed reunification or 
the Constitution, they painted them as disloyal, juxtaposing the author’s party as both loyal and 
the logical solution to the threat presented by their opponents. While loyalty remained the 
foundation of the crisis over democracy in 1863 and 1864, eastern Pennsylvanians also 
interjected the concept in other ways, which reveal the contention over the concept and in 
political elections.  
Democratic newspaper editors in eastern Pennsylvania in 1863 and 1864 attempted to 
curtail the use of concepts such as loyalty and traitor amongst the regional populace. Despite 
their electoral successes in Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and Northampton counties, as well as 
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throughout much of eastern Pennsylvania in 1863 and 1864, the loyalty debate seemingly began 
to frustrate local Democrats.
159
 On several occasions, Democratic editors attempted to remove or 
at least lessen the importance of the term loyalty in the discourse of wartime politics. The Easton 
Argus and the Doylestown Democrat highlighted the fact that the use of loyalty referred to 
aristocratic and monarchal tendencies. The term loyalty, Hutter argued, “has no proper or 
significant meaning as applied to American citizens,” instead the term loyalty only applied to 
monarchies, with their kings and queens, whereas patriotism was a “co-relative term” with “free 
government.”160 Similarly, J. D. Mendenhall of the Doylestown Democrat urged readers that the 
term traitor was only a valid criticism of individuals “when a man takes arms into his hands 
against lawfully constituted rulers.”161 Both of their responses attempted to remove the power of 
Republican accusations that they were disloyal. Historians have noted that Democrats were at a 
decided disadvantage during the Civil War, because Republicans controlled access to much of 
the governmental infrastructure, power to hand out patronage positions, and presented their 
organization as the wartime Union Party.
162
 Democratic editors’ attempts to undermine the 
concept of what the terms loyalty and disloyalty meant that they could counter a strong tool in 
the Republican arsenal.
163
 In Reading, the city’s mayor reportedly outlawed the use of 
nicknames, such as Copperhead or other politicized nicknames in the summer of 1863.
164
 
Jackson’s acknowledgement that local Democrats wanted to remove the use of derogatory 
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nicknames from use in town highlights their desire to remove loyalty from the discourse of 
wartime politics. Such a sentiment reinforces the importance of loyalty, and at least for 
Democrats, the power of the criticisms against them, during the Civil War.  
Jackson’s revelation however is also an indication of the underlying irony that ran 
throughout the discourse of loyalty. Democrats often criticized the Lincoln administration and 
other local editors for the restriction of free speech in public or in their local newspapers. One of 
the most significant events Democratic editors targeted was the arrest of Clement Vallandigham, 
the outspoken, anti-war Senator from Ohio. After a speech at Mount Vernon, Ohio where 
Vallandigham intentionally lambasted the war as a tool to free slaves and sacrifice American 
liberties, General Ambrose Burnside placed Vallandigham under arrest.
165
 Neiman captured the 
sentiments of local Democrats as he criticized Republicans for falling to sustain free speech 
during the war.
166
 In this light, the attempt to eliminate the Copperhead label in Reading and the 
discussion of loyalty throughout eastern Pennsylvania was deeply ironic. Editors for the local 
Democratic papers demanded the right to free speech, but only insofar as it helped them. Once 
Republicans began to wield the hammer of loyalty and the associated nicknames, like 
Copperheads, Democrats attempted to curtail the use of that language. 
In addition to attempts to curtail the language of loyalty, accusations of electoral fraud 
also appeared in the papers of eastern Pennsylvania editors from both parties. In the aftermath of 
defeat, local editors criticized their opponents of cheating to gain victory. Locally, Democratic 
editors found little reason to complain, consistently sweeping away their Republican opponents. 
Yet, they did find room to complain about larger state and national elections, arguing that 
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Republicans used fraud and intimidation to thwart the proper election of Democratic 
candidates.
167
 Republican editors likewise focused on electoral defeats on the local level.
168
 
Although these accusations of fraud appeared following elections in small numbers, the fact that 
the editors published them at all pushes the notion of disloyalty and democratic crisis to the front 
of the election cycle. Here, the crisis took on a new form, the perception that Democrats and 
Republicans abused the democratic process. Editors implied that such actions were anathema to 
core American principles, such as the right to vote, and therefore their political opponents were 
disloyal.  
Attempts to discredit the language of loyalty or the accusations of electoral fraud extends 
the idea that loyalty was a complicated concept that permeated much of eastern Pennsylvania’s 
Civil War society. Throughout the third and fourth years of the war, loyalty as evidenced above, 
took on a significantly more politicized and derisive context. Gone were the days when 
Democrats, Republicans, soldiers, and civilians advocated for a united sense of loyalty. The 
development of a crisis of democracy was an accidental development of their desire for unity 
based on their definitions of loyalty and their desire to secure electoral victory. Editors 
positioned their opponents as disloyal elements, which in turn created a crisis in the democratic 
process. The antagonism and fear about the possible election of political opponents was an 
unintentional extension of the loyalty debates. At the beginning of the war, soldiers, civilians, 
and newspaper editors positioned loyalty in a dichotomy where antipartisan unity represented 
loyalty and partisanship or support of the Confederacy as disloyal. But the definitions of loyalty 
produced by newspaper editors remained politically based at their core—either unconditional 
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support for Lincoln’s handling of the war or a strictly limited interpretation of the war effort. As 
individuals failed to adhere to their opponent’s definition of loyalty, unity cracked. In its place 
this crisis of democracy appeared in an environment already rich with division between the 
Union and Confederacy. What followed was the belief for eastern Pennsylvanians that their 
political opponents represented a threat to the survival of the nation. As such loyalty continued to 
inform, at least perceptually, how eastern Pennsylvanians viewed who were “true” Americans 
during the Civil War. Political preference and the definition of loyalty one adhered to defined 
how local residents viewed inclusion in the idea of the nation. If a man or woman expressed a 
similar version of loyalty, they were “true Union men” (or women). But if they did not share the 
same political and loyalty-based identities, they were traitors to the nation, equal to the 
Confederates, and opposed to the true principles of being an American. Perceptions of loyalty 
informed these sentiments among the local populace.  By assuming that their political opponents 
were disloyal traitors threatening to destroy the nation, ordinary men and women in eastern 
Pennsylvania truly believed that elections in 1863 and 1864 would determine the fate of the 
nation.  
The transition of loyalty from the early portion of the war until its use in 1863 and 1864 
should again push us to understand the complicated nature of loyalty. It was an organic 
construct, not something merely defined as the historical community has tried to do, with one 
party as loyal and the other less so. Democrats and Republicans equally implemented the concept 
of loyalty as a derisive concept throughout the third and fourth years of the war. Eastern 
Pennsylvanians became so embittered, so divided over the perceptions of loyalty that they drifted 
apart socially in some instances, and especially politically. Their conceptions of loyalty remained 
central to this process of division as well as the depiction of the political elections as crucial 
80 
 
moments in the conduct of the Civil War. Divisions amongst the men and women of eastern 
Pennsylvania became dangerous in 1863 and 1864 because they came to see loyalty as the 
defining element of whether a person stood to save or destroy the Union.   
81 
 
Conclusion 
Anxiety Vanished? 
 In the months that followed the 1864 Presidential Election, the Civil War entered another, 
final stage. Much like the preceding years, when the elections passed, the discourse of loyalty 
amongst eastern Pennsylvanians faded from the headlines, replaced by discussions of the war 
and the occasional interjection of party rhetoric. However, unlike the struggle’s first four years, 
the discourse of loyalty failed to reach the same antagonistic fervor it had before in the spring of 
1865. Lincoln’s electoral victory and the Northern military victory a few months later ended the 
crisis, the possibility that the election of the ‘wrong’ party would spell disaster for the nation. Of 
course, contemporary individuals did not know when the war would end, but Lincoln’s electoral 
victory brought in a renewed vigor to the Union war effort.
169
 Victory was near at hand. Grant 
and Petersburg, Sherman and the sea, these events, the last months of fighting came to dominate 
the columns of local newspapers and grabbed the attention of eastern Pennsylvania soldiers and 
civilians, replacing the bitter discussion of politicized loyalty. 
 After Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865, the war 
was all but over. Eastern Pennsylvanians rallied together, across the political divide, to rejoice “a 
glorious day in the history of this nation…the day of triumph.”170 Democrats and Republicans 
equally shared a relief that the war was over.
171
 That joyous outpouring however was short lived, 
as six days later Abraham Lincoln died in a bed too small for his towering frame, across the 
street from Ford’s Theater, struck down by John Wilkes Booth. In the wake of Lincoln’s 
assassination, eastern Pennsylvanians, humbled and grieving, banded together again at least 
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temporarily, in support of their fallen Chief Executive. Despite the years of rancor, division, and 
condemnation of one another about the issue of loyalty, Democrats and Republicans both praised 
Lincoln. For the country, his death was “a terrible tragedy” and “fell like a thunder clap” across 
the nation, Daniel Neiman from the Easton Sentinel reported.
172
 They felt, “At a time like this, 
political differences sink into nothingness, and every heart that is not dead to...feelings of 
humanity, beats in unison with abhorrence of the dastardly act.”173 Collectively the residents of 
Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, and Northampton put aside their political differences and mourned for the 
murder of their President, praising him for ending the war and setting the nation on a path to 
peaceful restoration.
174
 Amidst their grief, eastern Pennsylvanians turned their attention to the 
hunt for Lincoln’s killer, the subsequent trials of Booth’s associates, as well as the search for ex-
Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Local editors turned their attention to these topics, 
wresting control away from the issue of loyalty in the following months.  
 That spring, amongst the turmoil of the war’s final days, local elections passed with little 
fanfare from the regional editors. No one discussed political loyalty or offered the traditional 
political banter that dominated headlines for so long during the Civil War. Between the end of 
March and the early parts of May, the use of loyalty all but disappeared from discussion in the 
region. After four years of bloody warfare that killed upwards of 750,000 men, cost billions of 
dollars, and remade the American nation, life began to return to normal for local residents. 
Newspaper editors focused their attention to local events, European affairs, and farming. Soldiers 
returned from the Union Army, families reunited, and the horror of battle passed into memory. 
The anxiety of four years of civil war seemed to have disappeared, along with the bitter 
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contention that dominated the political arena that also appeared to have slunk underneath the 
outpouring joy that accompanied the arrival of peace. Despite the enthusiasm Democrats and 
Republicans expressed in the war’s conclusion, the scars of the war remained far from healed. In 
fact, as spring gave way to summer, the return of electoral contests tore asunder any healing 
made towards the wounds suffered from the derisive nature of Civil War loyalty. Much like the 
wartime calendar that witnessed the ebb and flow of discourse over loyalty in regional papers, 
the return of the political campaign season returned partisan animosity to the newspapers and 
streets of eastern Pennsylvania.  
The summer of 1865 saw the return of what we could politics as usual, but the pervasive 
issue of wartime loyalty made it difficult for eastern Pennsylvanians to return to a strictly normal 
sense of antebellum politics. Although local residents marginalized the issue of loyalty at the 
conclusion of the war and in its immediate aftermath, they dragged it back out again in the 
middle of 1865. Editors from both parties quickly returned to their 1864 form, recalling the 
memory of wartime loyalty to influence the fall elections. The stakes for the nation were no 
longer as high as they had been for eastern Pennsylvanians in the crisis that dominated the last 
two years of the war. Such a distinction in severity however did not alter the ways in which 
editors interjected loyalty back into the political discourse. Wartime nicknames remained a 
common practice. Democrats still viewed their Republican adversaries as Abolitionists who 
upset the racial order, while Republicans conversely maintained the Copperhead nickname.
175
 
The use of these nicknames, starting as early as May 1865, but reaching a more frequent 
appearance in late August and September, reveal that editors reincorporated the language of 
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loyalty back into the local political debate. With the return of the Copperhead and Abolitionist 
labels, we can glean several important aspects of the immediate post-Civil War political 
discourse. First, editors used similar forms of rhetoric as they did during the war, offering 
characterizations of loyalty or disloyalty. Second, we see that the memory of loyalty quickly took 
root in the political dialogue of the postbellum period. Eastern Pennsylvanians had engrained the 
language of loyalty into their political rhetoric.  
However, the use of loyalty returned in more than just the nicknames supplied by editors 
to classify their opponents as disloyal. Their resurrection of loyalty revived the notion that one 
party had been loyal during the war, while the other had not. Democrats, as their use of the 
Abolitionist label suggests, heavily focused on the issue of race. “If you are in favor of negro 
equality” or “going up to the ballot box by the side a wooly-headed negro” or are “in favor of 
admitting the negro into your family circle…vote the Abolition ticket” but if local men were in 
favor of sustaining “the Constitution, the Union and the cause of the white man” they were 
encouraged to vote for the Democratic ticket.
176
 The intention was to articulate that Republicans 
had betrayed the nation and its principles by subverting the racial hierarchy. Democrats did not 
always argue in racial terms, as we can see when they urged their constituents to support a party 
that “never abused or betrayed” the Constitution, power, or the people.177 But through both 
examples, Democratic editors conjured the notion that Republicans acted disloyally during the 
Civil War. Abolitionists opposed the established racial order, ordained by the Constitution, and 
were deliberately disloyal to the principles of the American nation. Electing Democratic 
candidates would “vindicate” and help correct the course of the nation, essentially righting the 
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wrongs of the war years.
178
 Republican editors sidestepped the racial issue and focused heavily 
on the perceived disloyalty of Democrats during the Civil War. Copperheads had a “record of 
hostility…to a vigorous and successful prosecution of the war against treason,” which along with 
their “want of sympathy for the Union Soldier,” completely proved “the disloyalty of the 
Copperhead party.”179 In the summer and fall of 1865, Republicans called on the fact that 
Democrats opposed many of their wartime measures (evidenced by constant Democratic 
attempts to subvert emancipation), thus reminding local residents of the perceived disloyalty of 
Republican opponents during the Civil War. Regardless of whether the arguments centered 
around the usage of race or hostility to Lincoln’s conduct during the war, after a brief period of 
relaxed anxieties over the issue of loyalty, local editors revived such discussions in full force for 
the political campaigns of 1865 in eastern Pennsylvania.
180
  
The reemergence of the rhetoric of loyalty, although on a less grand scale, is a good place 
to reflect on the meaning of that concept for eastern Pennsylvanians both during and after the 
Civil War. Even with the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, the return of local soldiers, and the 
joy of the conflict’s termination, regional residents could not shake the legacy of loyalty. Four 
years of bitter, antagonistic rhetoric left deep divisions amongst the people of Berks, Bucks, 
Lehigh, and Northampton counties. Members of both parties during the war saw their political 
organization as the only entity capable of rescuing the nation. Historiographically, this 
antagonistic use of loyalty amongst individuals like James Peifer, Beates Swift, Thomas Jackson, 
Mary Hornbeck, and the local newspaper editors alert us to the inadequacies of how previous 
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historians have framed investigations of Civil War era loyalty. Instead of inquiring as to who was 
loyal, my examination explored the concept of loyalty and its meaning to ordinary men and 
women. Likewise, the reemergence of loyalty after the war’s conclusion highlights the 
importance of loyalty as a factor in eastern Pennsylvanians daily lives. It not only affected the 
contours of the war, but it hardened the political divide of the region. The first post-war elections 
highlight how much conceptions of loyalty divided eastern Pennsylvania during and after the 
war.  
Of course, loyalty was not the only concept that influenced their wartime experience, 
everything from class to race to gender (among a great many others) played a part as well. But 
those concepts, while important, have received a great deal of attention from the historical 
community already.  Loyalty as lens of analysis, on the other hand, has not received nearly 
enough. Historians have discussed who was loyal, but not how ordinary people used loyalty. My 
examination of loyalty as a cultural concept revealed that depictions of loyalty not only affected 
the political realm, but also manifested itself amongst social relations, views on the war, and 
consequently generated a crisis for American democracy.   
 The scope of this project remained limited in order to understanding how loyalty worked 
on a personal scale in one divided region of the country. How did it work outside the boundaries 
of this region? Eastern Pennsylvania, while based in agricultural pursuits, with a mixture of 
urban and rural settings, cannot represent the whole North, nor the rest of the Keystone. There is 
a pressing need to understand how Americans, in an expanded geographic and chronological 
frame understood and used loyalty. Did the Midwest, a hotbed for anti-war sentiment, and 
arguably the birthplace of Copperheadism differ from Eastern Pennsylvania in regards to 
loyalty? What about New England and other staunchly Republican localities? How did border 
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states, such as Maryland or Missouri, occupied in some instances by Federal Forces and as the 
battleground for many of the war’s engagements fit into the picture? What about West Virginia, 
a place that to show its displeasure with secession seceded from Virginia? Additionally, as the 
post-war experiences of 1865 indicate, loyalty remained a significant aspect of the post-war 
political culture. Historiographically, the trend is to highlight how Republicans waved the 
“bloody shirt”—critiquing Democrats for wartime disloyalty. 181 My brief foray into the post-war 
world shows this was the practice almost from the outset. Yet I should also stress that Democrats 
waved a “black shirt” that attacked Republicans on the issue of race and emancipation. Despite a 
brief reprieve, politicians and their supporters in eastern Pennsylvania easily turned towards 
“shirt” waving, accusing their opponents of wartime disloyalty to aid their postwar electoral 
chances. Therefore, in future studies of loyalty we should also ask how Americans used loyalty 
in the post-war years of Reconstruction? When and how did the wartime conceptions of loyalty 
die out? Did they?  
Historians need to continue parsing the importance, effects, and conceptions of loyalty on 
the Northern populace during the Civil War. After all, the depictions of political parties as 
Copperheads and Blacksnakes embedded the conceptions of loyalty into an either-or paradigm. 
The election of one party, one definition of loyalty, as depicted by eastern Pennsylvanians, 
offered the prospects of successful reunification and Union victory, while the political opposition 
presented despair, turmoil, and division of the nation. Eastern Pennsylvanians deployed loyalty 
as means to understand politics and daily life during the Civil War; it drove how they 
conceptualized the conflict and the people around them. “All anxiety for the future…vanished” 
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with the conclusion of the war, but the divisive nature of loyalty, ever present during the war, 
remained deeply etched into the hearts of eastern Pennsylvania’s men and women.182  
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